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ABSTRACT
CONGRESS’S FAILED POTENTIAL: THE GULF 
OF TONKIN RESOLUTION AND THE 
WAR POWERS ACT
by
Jason Andrew Frayer
Dr. Joseph A. Fry, Examination Committee Chair 
Distinguished Professor of History 
University of Nevada Las Vegas
This paper examines congressional surrender through the passage of the 
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and how Congress attempted to regain its co-equal 
powers of war through the end of the Vietnam War by restricting funds to 
Southeast Asia and by the passage of the War Powers Act. The thesis also 
explores the intentions of the Founder’s on separating the “sword” from the 
“purse” into two separate branches, and how the escalation of the Cold War led 
the U.S. into Vietnam. Finally, the paper concluded that the passage of the War 
Powers Act was unnecessary and unconstitutional because it granted power to 
the executive not delegated in the Constitution. It also concluded that the debate 
over the war powers of Congress and the President are still alive today because 
of past precedents and judicial decisions.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
There are no hard and fast rules in time of war. The only guidance we have 
are those principles encased in the Constitution. The same held true for the 
Vietnam War; nevertheless the executive superseded relevant stipulated statutes 
in Article II to wage the war and Congress failed to live up to its mandated 
responsibilities to oversee the function of the war. The Gulf of Tonkin incident 
and resolution provided a platform for the United States to intervene in Vietnam, 
but the way the United States entered the war was at best questionable. The 
United States Navy, under orders from the White House, provoked the alleged 
attacks of early August 1964.
For Lyndon B. Johnson, the Gulf of Tonkin incident was his opportunity to 
prove that he was a strong cold warrior in the fight against communism and that 
he would not be the first president to lose a war. Without adequate debate, and 
without knowing all of the facts to make an informed decision, the United States 
Congress overwhelmingly passed a resolution giving Johnson carte blanche over 
involvement in Vietnam. For most of the war. Congress left the tough decisions 
to the President. Perhaps the country was in an age that required quick decision 
making, and the need for secrecy. Both Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
relied on secrecy to continue their efforts in Vietnam and to prevent 
congressional dissent.
As this thesis will explain, congressional hawks prevailed over their dove 
counterparts. This was evident through continuous congressional appropriations 
supporting the executive’s approach to the war. There were only a handful of 
senators debating the origins of the war, and it was not until 1971 that Congress 
repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, finally living up to its constitutional 
obligation to debate the issues. Two years later, a beleaguered Congress 
passed the War Powers Resolution, declaring that the President could initiate 
military actions, but had to secure the approval of Congress to continue 
hostilities. The drafters of the war powers resolution saw the legislation as a way 
to regain Congress’ influence over war powers and foreign relations, but 
subsequent events have demonstrated that their efforts were largely futile.
The Founders never intended for the executive to reign over foreign affairs the 
way presidents have since the Second World War. They devised specific 
guidelines and provisions within the Constitution that envisioned a cooperative 
approach to foreign relations. As James Madison stated in Federalist fifty-one, “It 
is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the 
oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice 
of the other part.”  ̂ Nevertheless, founders like Alexander Hamilton expressed the 
need for a strong executive, and perhaps the United States has reached an era
^Roy P. Fairfield ed., The Federalist Papers (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1981), 161.
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in Post World War II where a strong executive is needed, but the Constitution has 
not been amended to reflect that change.
Amending the Constitution was not the avenue presidents took to justify their 
actions in foreign affairs. Since World War II, the world has entered a new phase 
of technological progression and international commitments. Precedents and 
international organizations have frequently superseded the constitutional policy 
that gave Congress the sole authority to declare war (so say the executive 
branch), and new world organizations and treaties have contributed to the mix, 
by promoting the lack of oversight by Congress. Harry S. Truman used the 
ratification of the United Nations as justification for committing troops in Korea.
He believed that since Congress had approved the treaty, the President had the 
power to commit troops on their behalf without seeking further authorization from 
the U.S. Congress.
Our foreign policy after World War II focused on the threat of Soviet-Chinese 
domination. Presidents have not only seized power through congressional 
inaction, but also by judicial decisions. Since the Prize Cases following the Civil 
War, the judiciary has given the executive enormous latitude to conduct foreign 
affairs outside the scope of congressional authority. But it was not what the 
Supreme Court said that resonated the loudest. Baker v. Carr reemphasized the 
political question doctrine in Marbury v. Madison, which has had a lasting impact 
on the questions the Court would hear. It left politics to the politicians saying that 
there are some things best left for the people to decide and not the courts, and 
since war is politicized, the courts have generally refrained from making
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
judgements in this area. Instead, presidents since 1950 have relied on 
precedent and treaties to justify their actions.
In 1966 Congress began investigating the administration’s policies regarding 
Vietnam and debate followed, but Congress was slow to react. Troop escalation 
continued until Johnson left office and funding was not cut off until the summer of 
1973. “During the seven-year span from July 1966 through July 1973, Congress 
recorded one hundred and thirteen votes on proposals related to the war. But its 
first limitation on U.S. military activities in Southeast Asia was not imposed until 
1969-a restriction on American troop deployments in Cambodia and Laos-and it 
directed its full opposition to a continued commitment in the region only in August 
1973, when it voted to stop all bombing throughout Indochina.”^
The result of congressional resurgence concluded with the War Powers 
Resolution. Its unintended effects resulted in further disturbing the equilibrium of 
checks and balances in favor of the executive. It was the final step in 
pronouncing that Congress was inept in its oversight of war. In essence. 
Congress gave the President enough time to succeed or fail by granting him a 
ninety day window to use military force. The United States Cold War policy and 
Vietnam conflict significantly increased the executive’s powers over war because 
of congressional and judicial acquiescence.
^Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), 491.
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CHAPTER II
CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT 
What were the Founders intentions regarding the separate branches of 
government? The answer depends on who is discussing the issue. There are 
certainly different philosophies about the intentions of the delegates to the 
constitutional convention of 1787. Nevertheless, we have written proof of the 
powers delegated to each branch by the convention. Those delegated powers 
made it quite clear who the founders wanted to control the entrances and exits to 
foreign wars. Congress was empowered to declare war, but the framers did not 
envision Congress authorizing war through a resolution. Hence, the authors of 
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution overstepped boundaries specifically designed to 
control presidential actions and monitor the progression of war. As Paul 
Eidleberg has argued, “if only for its own sake, democracy requires restraints.”  ̂
The classic debate over constitutional intentions has spilled over to this 
century. During the constitutional revival of the 1980s, (a look back at original 
intent) Edwin Meese III, Attorney General under President Ronald Reagan, tried 
to recapture the intent of the Founding Fathers. He emphasized that “this was a 
written document; something has been written down, and the language they
^Paul Eidelberg, The Philosophy of the American Constitution: A Reinterpretation of the 
Intentions of the Founding Fathers (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 260.
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chose meant something.”  ̂ Meese maintained that “we know how the Founding 
Fathers lived, and much of what they read, thought, and believed. Arguments 
were written down so that their ideas and conclusions could be widely circulated, 
read, and understood.”  ̂ Meese also acknowledged that the Constitution was not 
meant for one age; it was perpetual and not bound to the time in which it was 
written.
Where the language of the Constitution was specific, it must be obeyed. 
Where there is demonstrable consensus among the framers and ratifiera 
as to principle stated or implied by the Constitution, it should be followed 
as well. Where there is ambiguity as to the precise meaning or reach of a 
constitutional provision, it should be interpreted and applied in a manner 
so as to at least not contradict the text of the Constitution itself.®
At the same time, Meese conceded that the Constitution leaves us with
exceedingly few conclusions. “Because the document posits so few conclusions,
it leaves to the more political branches the matter of adopting and vivifying its
principles in each generation.”^
William Brennan, former Supreme Court Justice, repudiated Meese’s
conclusion about the importance of a written document: “Like every text worth
reading, it is not crystalline. The phrasing is broad and the limitations of its
provisions are not clearly marked.”® He responded that this was not a perfect
''Edwin Meese III, “Interpreting the Constitution,” in Interpreting the Constitution: The 
Debate over Original Intent ed. Jack N. Rakove (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990), 
15.
®lbid„ 14.
®lbid„ 17.
"ibid., 19.
^William Brennan, “The Constitution of the United States,” in Interpreting the Constitution: 
The Debate over Original Intent ed. Jack N. Rakove (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 
1990), 23.
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document, and that the founders’ intentions are rather meaningless. “Our 
distance of two centuries cannot but work as a prism refracting all we perceive.”
It was “far from clear whose intention is relevant; the drafters, congressional 
disputants, or ratifiers.”® Original intent meant little for former Justice Brennan.
He deemed the document transcendent. “The genius of the Constitution rests 
not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but 
in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current 
n e e d s . T h e  greatness of the Constitution was its flexibility and ambiguity. “To 
remain faithful to the context of the Constitution, therefore, an approach to 
interpreting the text must account for the existence of these substantive value 
choices, and must accept the ambiguity inherent in the effort to apply them to 
certain modern circumstances.”^̂
The executive and the legislature each have distinctive duties concerning war 
and foreign affairs. The President’s powers are listed under Article II of the 
United States Constitution. Section I of Article II provides the president the 
power to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. In 
Section II, the president functions as the Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy and of militia of several states when called into actual service of the United 
States. Finally, the executive has the capability to make treaties with the advice
'"ibid., 27.
"ibid., 27.
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and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, and the executive nominates and 
receives ambassadors/^
Congress’ delegated power to control war and access over foreign affairs is 
more extensive than that of the executive. The legislature’s specific powers in 
this area are listed in Article I, Section 8. Congress has the power to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations and regulate land and naval forces of the United 
States. It also has the power to provide and maintain a navy and suppress 
insurrections and repel invasions. In addition. Congress is empowered to 
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and governing any 
portion of the militia employed in the service of the United States. One of the 
most expandable and yet limited clauses in Section 8 of Article I is the 
“necessary and proper” clause. Under this clause, virtually anything could 
become necessary or proper in the defense of the United States. That Is why it 
is limited in scope. Finally, the most important portions of Article I regarding war 
powers are the eleventh and twelfth clauses. They state that Congress has the 
power to declare war, grant letters of marquee and reprisal, and make rules 
regarding the capture of soldiers or property during war. Congress also raises 
and supports armies, but no appropriation of money to that use may be enacted 
for a term of longer than two years.
The Founders assigned these powers and chose the specific language 
purposefully. Why did they use such explicit language? “At the time of the
'^Martin Shapiro ed., The Constitution of the United States and Related Documents 
(Illinois; Harlan Davidson Inc, 1973), 10-13.
'"ibid., 6-8.
8
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Constitution, the war-making power in all other countries was vested in the 
execut i ve.Hav ing recently separated from the hold of Great Britain, the United 
States reacted against contemporary practices and transferred “all executive 
power... to the Continental Congress.” ®̂ The alleged tyranny of the King of 
England was obvious to the people of the former colonies.
In constructing a government during and after the Revolution, the United 
States first developed the Articles of Confederation. That particular system of 
government denied an executive from possessing any genuine authority. The 
Articles of Confederation placed power in a Congress still dominated by the 
states. There was hardly any mention of an executive or executive power. In 
this system Congress had the power to send and receive ambassadors and it 
could solely negotiate treaties with other countries. The Articles, like the 
Constitution, placed the responsibilities for war under Congress. It held the 
power to declare war. Congress also had the authority to fund and raise armies 
and provide for the common defense. Article nine of the Articles of 
Confederation explicitly stated that Congress had the “sole and express right and 
power of determining on peace and war.” ®̂ The executive had no power to 
direct, fund, use or create anything in war or foreign relations without the direct 
supervision of the Congress. “The articles did not provide for an independent
"Robert A. Diamond, Powers of Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly, 1976), 79-80.
'"Gary M. Sterr
to War (Westport, Connecticut; Greenwood Press, 1994), 12
'"Mortimer J. Adler, Great Bo 
(Chicago; Robert P. Gwinn, 1990), 7.
n and Morton H. Halperin ed., The U.S. Constitution and the Power to Go
oks of the Western World; American State Papers Vol. 40
9
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executive; nor did they provide for a unitary executive."^^ In fact, under the 
Articles, Congress appointed a commander in chief of the navy with the consent 
of the at least nine states/® That the executive was not the commander in chief 
of the armed forces under this system had a momentous impact on the future 
U.S. Constitution.
The Articles of Confederation had its flaws, but not all of its features were 
scrapped when the founders of our current Constitution decided to do away with 
the Articles. Our constitutional framers foresaw an elective body as the 
government of the future. The constitutional convention of 1787 specifically 
separated the powers of war and funding to avoid future calamities: they believed 
the power of the “sword” and “purse” should “never be in the same h a n d s . I n  
fact the capacity to wage war was not a primary focus of the summer convention, 
and “on August 17, 1787, with little debate the Framers substituted make for 
declare.” ®̂ The sought to separate the functions of initiating and controlling war, 
and by substituting “declare” for “make” the founders believed they gave the 
President enough room to wage war if the country were invaded.
Nobody questioned presidential authority to repel a sudden attack or fight a 
defensive war. That was why the Founders changed the wording used in the 
Constitution to express their desires for the President to successfully fight off
'"Eidelberg, The Philosophy of the American Constitution 167.
'"Adler, Great Books of the Western World, 8.
'"stern and Halperin, The U.S. Constitution and the Power to Go to War 13-14.
^°Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 83.
10
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invasions. They exchanged the word “make” to “declare” war in Section 8 of 
Article I, so that the president would not be hampered in his pursuits to defend 
the nation in case of foreign invasion. When the framers did “substitute declare 
for make, the new wording was not intended to shift from the legislature to the 
Executive this general power to engage the country in war. At most, the sole 
reason for the substitution was to confirm the Executive’s power to repel sudden 
attacks.”^̂
War scared the Founders. They knew all too well that the power to 
commence, fight, and fund war could cast a country into disarray. Therefore, 
they installed checks and balances preferably to prevent the initiation of an all out 
war by a single man or a small party. James Wilson stated that a system of 
checks and balances “will not hurry us into war, it is a calculated guard against it. 
It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men.”^̂  The 
Framers of the Constitution believed that collective decision-making and 
separation of powers were the constitutional devices for preventing careless 
wars. James Madison justified his position by saying that “those who are to 
conduct war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a 
war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded.” ®̂ It was too dangerous 
to allow single individuals to have complete control over war. Still, the debate 
over who has what power continues. “Issues have arisen as to where some
^'“Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat,” Harvard Law 
Review 81 (June 1968): 1773. Courtesy of the Virtual Vietnam Project at Texas Tech University.
^^Stern and Halperin, The U.S. Constitution and the Power to Go to War. 13.
^"ibid., 13.
11
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power lies, and these have been claims by one branch to authority admittedly 
possessed also by another.”®"*
In spite of the debate, the Constitution squarely placed unique powers with 
each branch in order to preserve order. “The Framers were quite deliberate 
about placing with Congress the fundamental power to deploy armed forces.”®® 
Congress was to be the mechanism for controlling war. James Madison, a 
primary drafter of the Constitution, asserted that the “vital power to declare war 
was vested in Congress and the power of the President was to be strictly 
construed. Doubt as to the exact location of any power in this field was to be 
resolved in favor of the legislature.”®® Regardless of the complications or 
questionable decisions, the scales were supposed to be tipped in favor of the 
legislative branch. As Robert Diamond stated, “Congress has the general 
powers that taken together, enable it to reach virtually everywhere it will in 
foreign affairs.”®̂ The reason Congress’s power was to reach everywhere, was 
that it was more of a representative government body. More diversity would 
generate better ideas.
Although Congress was to control declaring and funding war, the framers also 
recognized that a strong executive was important to the function of foreign affairs 
and war making. They made the President the commander in chief for a number
^"louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (Mineola, New York: The Foundation
Press, 1972), 92.
""stern and Halperin, The U.S. Constitution and the Power to Go to War. 11. 
""Diamond, Powers of Congress. 52.
""ibid., 53.
12
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of reasons. According to Alexander Hamilton, the “direction of the war most 
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a 
single head.”®® But the commander in chief's authority has also been debated. 
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson explained in Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer 
in 1952 that the “commander in chief clause implied something more than an 
empty title. But just what authority goes with the name has plagued presidential 
advisors who would not waive or narrow it by nonassertion yet cannot say where 
it begins or ends.”®®
Having clarified the stated powers of the elected branches of government, it is 
necessary to examine the intention of the authors of the Constitution. The 
Federalist Papers written by John Jay, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison 
were the earliest and still the best indicators of what the Framers had projected 
for the future and what they thought the Constitution lacked. Considering that 
they attended and participated in the convention, their writings afford insight into 
the thinking behind the creation of the Constitution. In Federalist twenty-six, 
Hamilton examined the 1688 English Revolution and concluded that it was 
“unlawful to have a standing army within the kingdom in the time of peace, unless 
with the consent of Parliament.”®® He also stated that “when they referred the 
exercise of that power to the judgement of the legislature, they had arrived at the
""stern and Halperin, The U.S. Constitution and the Power to Go to War. 14. Part of 
Federalist Papers 74, signifying the power of war and the appropriateness of a single person 
commanding military action.
""Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President (Lawrence, 
Kansas; University Press of Kansas, 1997), 257.
""Fairfield, ed.. The Federalist Papers. 71.
13
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ultimate point of precaution which was reconcilable with the safety of the 
community.”®̂ Collective decision-making was a precaution against hasty and 
reckless behavior, or so the Convention thought.
Alexander Hamilton further expounded on his thesis of a robust executive in 
Federalist sixty-nine and seventy. In sixty-nine, Hamilton differentiated the King 
of England from the American version of a president. He said that the King of 
Great Britain was the sole and absolute representative of the nation in all foreign 
transactions. “He can of his own accords make treaties of peace, commerce, 
alliance, and every other description.”®® Hamilton added that there was “no 
comparison between the Intended power of the President and the actual power of 
the British sovereign.” The King “can perform alone what the other can do only 
with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature.” Plus, the “President would 
be an officer elected by the people for four years; the king of Great Britain is a 
perpetual and hereditary prince.”®®
After writing that eloquent passage about the differences between the King of 
England and the American President, Hamilton contradicted himself in Federalist 
seventy. In seventy, he proclaimed that the “energy in the executive is essential 
to the protection of the community against foreign attacks, and a feeble executive 
implies a feeble execution of the government.”®"̂ In other words, Hamilton 
believed that the executive needed to be largely free from restraint to be an
"'ibid., 72. 
""ibid., 194.
""ibid., 195, 197.
""ibid., 198.
14
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effective leader. He explained, “decision, activity, secrecy, dispatch will generally 
characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than 
the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is 
increased, these qualities will be diminished.”®® Hamilton appeared to describe 
secrecy as a quality of the executive. That certain acts require the decision and 
secrecy of one man over the majority contradicted a checked and balanced 
government.
In light of more than 200 years of change, has the Constitution adapted to 
meet the needs of a new world? No doubt we are in an age that demands fast 
response and deliberate action in foreign affairs. Contemporary analysts deem 
that, “the twentieth century and a standing army have shifted much of the war 
power to the President.”®® Modern emergencies and a fast paced society have 
transferred many of the important aspects of foreign affairs to the office of the 
executive, and “the war-making power of the President constantly erodes the 
war-declaring power of congress.”®̂ “The President shares no greater power 
than when the nation is facing a crisis, a time when he becomes the expected 
figure of power and leadership without partisan restraint and is able to strengthen 
his power image as a commander in chief in times of war.”®® Why is that? 
Several authors have written that congressional acquiescence is the central
""ibid., 199.
""stern and Halperin, The U.S. Constitution and the Power to Go to War. 11. 
""ibid., 11.
""Thomas B. Curtis and Donald L. Westerfield, Congressional Intent (Westport,
Connecticut: Praeger, 1992), 33.
15
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cause of the erosion of checks and balances and the rise of presidential war 
powers. Since the adoption of the Constitution, presidents have made it custom 
to overcome legislative restraint. Therefore, “practice and acquiescence for a 
number of years can be instrumental in fixing the meaning of the Constitution.”®® 
Since legislative restraint on war and foreign affairs has largely disappeared, 
presidents have seized the foreign policy initiative. As author Louis Henkin 
explained, “when the President acts and Congress is silent, there is often a 
justifiable presumption that Congress has acquiesced in, even approved, what 
the President has done; if so, the action is supported by the constitutional powers 
of both branches.”"*® The executive grasps power based on the silence of the 
legislature, and virtually makes custom constitutional. “So strong is the influence 
of custom that it seems almost to amend the Constitution.”"*̂
Nevertheless, custom does not change the Constitution and a resolution in 
place of a declaration was not what the Founders had intended. It was 
unconstitutional to go to war on a false pretense and a resolution does not meet 
the criteria of a declaration. Congress’s power to declare and fund war 
supercedes the power of the President’s directive to wage war. In fact, the 
President does not exercise the power of commander-in-chief until actually called 
into service by the Congress. The Supreme Court expressed in Powell v. 
McCormack, that just “because an unconstitutional action has been taken before
""Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts. 19.
"*°Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, 105. 
""Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts, 19.
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surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later 
date.”"*® The existence of prior presidential actions does not mean they are 
constitutional.
""ibid., 18-19.
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CHAPTER III
COMMUNISM AND FEAR 
The Second World War transformed the international arena. Confronted by 
the challenge of the Soviet Union, the United States could no longer remain 
isolated. Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States escaped the war virtually 
unscathed. Its infrastructure was undamaged and thrived throughout the war. 
“The United States emerged from World War II as a superpower and acquired 
the advantages and responsibilities of world leadership.’"*® During this new 
phase of the Cold War, Congress was generally content letting the President 
handle and initiate American policy abroad. Dissenters were seen as unpatriotic, 
and detractors were far from overbearing.
The 1940s was a pivotal time in the post-war foreign policy. President Harry 
S. Truman’s rhetoric on communism and containment ruled foreign policy until 
the 1990s. These hard-line policies were responsible for the Cuban-Missile 
Crisis and our ever steadily rise in Vietnam in the late 1950s and 1960s. The 
United States would only negotiate with communist governments from a position 
of power. “American officials, notably Dean Acheson, spoke of a future desire to 
negotiate from strength. The phrase did not imply negotiation at all, in the sense
""Elmer Plischke, U.S. Department of State: A Reference History (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1999), 394.
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of compromise and accommodation, but rather dictating terms to the other 
side."44
This fear of negotiation left Washington with little room to maneuver. Instead, 
the United States actively sought out communist aggression. For the people of 
the United States “anticommunism resonated with the fears felt by many 
Americans, and it helped them make sense of a complex and unfamiliar world- 
and of the rapid changes under way in their own country as well.”"® All the same, 
the policy of containment “allowed no role for diplomacy until the climatic final 
scene in which the men in the white hats accepted the conversion of the men in 
the black hats.”"®
Most of the policies and rhetoric concerning communism emerged within ten 
years after the end World War II, and most of those policies were set under 
President Harry Truman (1945-1953). The historian Henry Berger wrote in 1967 
that “for the past twenty years American foreign policy has been conducted 
essentially along ideological and practical lines established by the Truman 
Doctrine in 1947.”"^ His administration helped to shape the United States’ 
security policy concerning the Soviet Union for the next forty-five years, and U.S. 
policy involved clashes throughout the world between capitalism and
'"‘Fredrlk Logevall, “A Critique of Containment,” Diplomatic History. 28 ( September 
2004): 482.
"̂ Ibid., 493.
''®Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy. (New York, 1994), 471.
''^Henry W. Berger, “A Conservative Critique of Containment: Senator Taft on the Early 
Cold War Program," in To Advise and Consent: The United States Congress and Foreign Policy 
in the Twentieth Century, ed. Joel H Silbey. (Brooklyn: Carlson Publishing, 1991), 226.
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communism. “These two different social/economic/political/legal systems fought 
a long series of ideological battles, accompanied by periodic shooting wars 
between surrogate states.”"®
Truman, who assumed power after Franklin Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, 
had a rougher persona that symbolized the distrust many Americans held toward 
the Soviet Union. In his Four Point message to Congress, “Truman had 
accepted FDR’s view of the modern presidency as a powerful leadership 
office.”"® He led the country in foreign affairs by organizing a strong coalition of 
conservatives and liberals to back his initiatives. “Seldom did Truman have 
trouble piloting his foreign programs through either a Democratic or Republican 
Congress. Congress was generally compliant and the American people were 
yea-sayers.”®° Truman chartered his own policy and courted others to follow. “I 
make American foreign policy,” the blunt Missourian stated.®^
Truman oversaw the creation of the United Nations. It was similar to 
Woodrow Wilson’s idea of the League of Nations, but with actual enforcement 
instead of relying on international public opinion; and more importantly, 
participation by the United States made the organization seem viable. The 
United Nations (UN) charter was signed on June 26, 1945, in San Francisco,
"'^Cynthia Watson, U.S. National Security A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, 
California; Contemporary World Issues, 2002), 6.
"‘^Harry S. Truman, “Harry Truman’s Point Four Message to Congress,” Historic 
Documents on the Presidency 1776-1989. ed. Michael Nelson, (Washington, D C.: 
Congressional Quarterly, 1989), 294.
^°Thomas G. Patterson, “Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress: The 
Truman Years,” in To Advise and Consent: The United States Congress and Foreign Policy in the 
Twentieth Century ed. Joel H Silbey (Brooklyn, New York: Carlson Publishing, 1991), 226.
^^Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (New York, 1956), 52.
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California. Within its preamble the UN outlined several aims. It sought to “save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to promote social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom.”®̂ To those ends the UN was committed to 
“unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by 
the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall 
not be used, save the common interest.”®®
The UN was organized into six organs: ranging from the general assembly 
and the security council to the International Court of Justice. In the general 
assembly, each member nation had a representative. The security council was 
different. The charter members of the United Nations: Great Britain, the Soviet 
Union and the United States were all permanent members. France became the 
fourth permanent member of the council and the Soviets were insistent that on a 
non-western country to fill the final seat. The final permanent occupant of the 
security council eventually became The People’s Republic of China. The 
remainder of the council were composed of ten countries that were selected from 
the general assembly for a period not to exceed two years.
This idealized new world order did not stop the harsh rhetoric between the 
East and West (capitalism versus communism). Former British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill gave a speech at Westminster College in central Missouri on 
March 5, 1946 titled the “The Sinews of Peace.” The speech “contained an
^̂ United Nations Charter. 2. Found at un.org/engiish or in Cynthia Waston’s book U.S. 
National Security, 132. A brief explanation of the charter and how to access it on-line.
® l̂bid., 2. 132.
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allusion that an iron curtain was descending on Europe-an image that was to 
remain powerful throughout the Cold War.”®" He stated that “from Stettin in the 
Baltic to Trieste in the Aduatic, an iron curtain has descended across the 
Continent.”®® Churchill also “warned that the safety of the world required a new 
unity in Europe, from which no nation should be permanently outcast.”®®
Even Churchill was uncertain of the Soviet’s intentions. “Nobody knows what 
Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends to do in the 
immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and 
proselytizing tendencies.”®̂ Still, he was smart enough to be cautious, to warn of 
the communists’ potential danger to the rest of the free world, and to advise that 
free democracies band together if peace were to prevail. Churchill asserted that 
“if the Western Democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles 
of the United Nations Charter, their influence for furthering those principles will be 
immense and no one is likely to molest them.”®® Churchill’s speech in Fulton, 
Missouri has often been called the “opening shot in the Cold War.”®®
In standing together to fight communism, the United States provided monetary 
support to nations struggling to rebuild after the war. America assisted the
^Watson, U.S. National Security, 133.
®^Winston Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace,” In; Winston Churchill; His Complete 
Speeches 1897-1963. Vol. 6. 1943-1949. 7285-7293. Ed. By Robert Rhodes James (Chelsea 
House Publishers: New York, 1974).
®®lbid.
^Ibid.
®®lbid.
59Logeyall, “A Critique of Containment,” 481.
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struggling countries to fight off insurgent communist uprisings and the “United 
States-Soviet tensions came to a head in Greece in 1947.”®° Following World 
War II, Britain could no longer afford to assist Greece and Turkey in their efforts 
to remain non-communist. Britain appealed to the United States to provide aid to 
these countries. “Great Britain notified the United States on February 21, 1947 
that it could no longer support Greece.”®̂ The telegram to Washington also 
stated that “assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.”®® 
The call for aid to Greece and Turkey came against the background of an 
emerging containment policy. George F. Kennan, the United States’ charge d’ 
affairs in Moscow, sent a telegram to Washington on February 22, 1946, 
describing the situation in the post war Soviet Union. In the letter Kennan 
warned of the Soviet anti-capitalist worldview and possible expansionism.®® The 
telegram, together with Kennan’s article on containment titled “Mr. X, ” published 
in July of 1947 have been seen by historians as the basis for United States 
policy. In the article in Foreign Affairs, Mr. X illustrated how the Soviets and the 
United States differed and how the United States had to contain Communist 
aggression. He believed that “Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the 
Western world is something that can be contained by vigilant application.”®"
®°Harry S. Truman, “Truman Doctrine,” Historic Documents on the Presidency 1776- 
1989. ed. Michael Nelson (W ashington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1989), 288.
®’ lbid.,288.
® l̂bid., 289.
^^Watson. U.S. National Security, 132.
^Ibid., 153. Also in Foreign Affairs (Volume 25, Issue 4).
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Kennan’s letter helped to form the basis of what became “containment,” because 
he expressed the concerns of policymakers in Washington that the Soviets were 
looking for confrontation. Kennan was convinced that the “Russians look forward 
to a duel of infinite duration, and that the United States must continue to regard 
the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena.”®®
In this spirit. President Truman appeared before a joint-session of Congress 
on March 12, 1947, and outlined his plan to assist free democracies. Truman 
stated in his declaration to Congress that the “Greek state is today threatened by 
the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who 
defy the government’s authority at a number of points.”®® The president 
recognized that “no other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary 
support for a democratic Greek government. The situation is an urgent one 
requiring immediate action, and the United Nations and its related organizations 
are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.”®̂
Greece was not the only country in need of assistance. Truman declared that 
“the future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly 
no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of 
Greece.”®® Truman outlined the United States’ policy objectives toward the 
spread of communism. He argued that “one of the primary objectives of the 
foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and
®®lbid., 153, 156.
®®Truman, “Truman Doctrine,” Historic Documents on the Presidency, 290. 
® l̂bid., 290.
®®lbid., 290.
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other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion,”®® and “to 
ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United 
States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations.” ®̂ To free the 
people of the world from tyranny became Truman’s doctrine, and thus the United 
States could not “fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour.”^̂
Truman solicited Congress to give $400 million in aid to Turkey and Greece. 
“The Republican dominated Congress approved Truman’s $400 million in aid to 
Greece and Turkey by a 3 to 1 margin. The assistance to Greece and Turkey 
was the first manifestation of the Truman Doctrine and of the containment 
theory.” ®̂ The speech was a key victory for Truman, and it passed the Senate 
67-23. “Once Truman had enunciated his doctrine before a joint session of 
Congress, many of its members hesitated to deny him his program.” ®̂ Truman 
also made a pledge to Congress concerning support to Greece and Turkey. “If 
further funds or further authority should be needed for the purposes indicated in 
this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On 
this subject the Executive and Legislative branches of the government must work 
together.” "̂
®®lbid.,291.
"“ ibid., 291.
^^Ibid., 292-293.
^^Patterson, “Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress: The Truman
Years,” 238.
^""Truman, “Truman Doctrine,” Historic Documents on the Presidency, 292.
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Not everyone in Congress supported Truman’s plans for assistance. Some 
feared deficits; others worried about being the world’s policemen. Nevertheless, 
Truman used the fears of many to achieve his own means. “The president 
exploited the frightening world events to garner support for his foreign policy.”
He also “exploited cold war tensions through an often alarmist, hyperbolic, 
anticommunist rhetoric, which he thought necessary, to insure favorable 
legislative votes to disarm his critics, and to nudge parsimonious congressmen to 
appropriate funds. Ultimately, the Truman administration found public opinion 
and the Congress to be permissive, not restrictive.” ®̂
The United States also moved in1947 to provide more support for failing 
economies across Europe, and thereby curb the spread of communist 
aggression. The Marshall Plan was announced by the new Secretary of State 
George C. Marshall following graduation ceremonies at Harvard University on 
June 5, 1947. The plan called for a “massive reconstruction project” to help prop 
up Western Europe and “stifle Soviet expansion.” Marshall explained that “it is 
logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the 
return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no 
political stability and no assured peace.” ®̂ The Marshall Plan was signed into 
law on April 4, 1948.
^^Patterson, “Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress: The Truman 
Years,” 227-28.
^®George 0. Marshall, “Against Hunger, Poverty, Desperation and Chaos," Speech at 
Harvard University Commencement, June 5, 1947, in Foreign Affairs. May-June 1997, 76 (no. 3): 
160.
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The end of the war also brought with it real fears; not just rhetoric. Even 
though the Soviets were burdened with casualties and devastation, it still 
emerged as a global power and the center of the communist world. “The 
collapse of Germany and Japan, and the severe weakening of Britain and 
France, had created power vacuums that the two remaining major powers (the 
United States and the Soviet Union) rushed to fill.”^̂  Looming over the emerging 
East-West conflict was a frightening new weapon. The United States had 
successfully produced the first atom bombs, and used them against Japan to end 
the war in the Pacific- first in Nagasaki on August 6, 1945 and then in Hiroshima 
on August 9, 1945. Yet the United States’ dominance in the atomic field would 
not last. “By 1949, the Soviets had developed the atomic bomb,” ®̂ and the 
atomic age and the nuclear arms race had officially begun.
That same year the United States formed an organization to check Soviet 
expansion. It was the Northern Alliance Treaty Organization (NATO). The NATO 
members agreed that an “armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” ®̂ Since the 
Russians had carved out a large buffer zone in Eastern Europe, the West moved 
to create an organization to protect Western Europe and Canada from a possible 
communist invasion. NATO’s preamble asserted that its members were 
“determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their
^^Logevall, “A Critique of Containment,” 486.
^®Watson, U.S. National Security. 5.
^^North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cfiarter, www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treatv.htm or 
found in Cynthia Watson’s book U.S. National Security. 159. it gives a brief description about 
NATO and where to find the document on the web.
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peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of 
law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area."®® 
That concept would be applied to other regions of the world as well.
This world’s polarization between East and West deepened further in1950. 
Communist North Korea invaded South Korea seeking to unify the peninsula 
under one communist government. Truman saw this assault as a violation of his 
Truman Doctrine, and under the flag of the United Nations, the United States 
sent troops into Korea during June 1950 to secure the South’s anticommunist 
independence. Truman never sought a declaration of war. Korea “was truly a 
presidential war but Congress voted funds time and time again to continue the 
war.’’®̂ Over the next three years, the United Nations, spear- headed by the 
United States, battled North Korea and eventually Communist China for control. 
The Korean War personified the Cold War: the major powers fighting indirectly- 
never head to head over different spots on the globe.
Before the Korean War began. President Truman had directed the Secretaries 
of State and Defense “to undertake a recommendation of our objectives in peace 
and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in light of the 
probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of 
the Soviet Union.’’®® In response, the State Department formulated NSC 68, 
which outlined a comprehensive strategy for national security. The
®“lbid., preamble on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s charter.
®Vatterson, “Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress; The Truman 
Years," 242.
®^NSG 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950. 
United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950, Vol. 1.
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memorandum recommended that the United States must “confront the Soviet 
Union with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world 
to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will.” The 
memorandum emphasized to “the government, the American people, and all the 
free peoples, that the Cold War is in fact a real war in which the survival of the 
free world is at stake.”®®
Senators Robert Taft (Ohio) and J. William Fulbright (Arkansas) voiced 
concerns over the country’s foreign policy in late 1940s, but the crowd muffled 
their voices. “Votes in the Senate on key postwar programs reveal that the 
Truman administration commanded the results. The Brettonwoods agreements 
(World Bank & the International Monetary Fund) passed 61-16, the United 
Nations Charter 89-2, assistance to Greece and Turkey 67-23 and NATO passed 
82-13.”®"
Truman’s successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower also accentuated the danger of 
allowing the spread of communism to infiltrate countries across the globe. In a 
press conference on April 7, 1954, Eisenhower cautioned that the “collapse of 
one government under threat of Communist oppression would lead to the 
collapse of neighboring states and a further progression of collapse around the 
world.”®® In this press conference, Eisenhower talked about the importance of 
Indochina. Since Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communists had taken control
®®lbid.
®^Patterson, “Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress: The Truman
®®Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower. 1954.
Years.” 241.
P
(Washington, D C.: GPG, 1955), 381-390.
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of China in 1949, some 450 million Asians had been lost to the Communist 
dictatorship, and “we simply cannot afford greater losses.”®® Eisenhower’s press 
conference came on the heels of John Foster Dulles “massive retaliation” speech 
to the Council on Foreign Affairs, in which he boldly confirmed that the “United 
States would respond with massive force at places and with means of its own 
choosing if provoked by Soviet aggression.”®̂ The 1950s brought its own 
challenges, but in large part the Eisenhower administration continued and 
strengthened the policies in foreign affairs set forth by Truman.
Despite Dulles’ rhetoric, Eisenhower’s “New Look” defensive strategy 
reinforced Truman’s “containment” policies and more likely than not strengthened 
them with his and Dulles denunciation of Soviet expansion. “His administration 
did little to alter the basic approach to foreign affairs of the Truman 
administration. The United States continued a policy of containment of 
communism and confrontation with the Soviet Union.”®® In addition to carrying 
over Truman’s policies, “Ike gave Congress a secretary of state so militant in his 
rhetoric that it would be appeased.”®®
As Eisenhower’s speech had suggested. Southeast Asia became increasingly 
important to U.S. policy during the 1950s. The concerns about Europe falling 
into communist hands were lessened by the United Nations, NATO and by the
®®lbid., 381-390.
®^Watson, U.S. National Security, 163.
®®Robert Schulzinger, U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1998), 232.
®®lbid., 234.
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hopes that the Marshall Plan would revitalize Western Europe. By contrast, many 
feared that Southeast Asia was ripe for communist revolutions. The French had 
attempted unsuccessfully to reassert their colonial control over Vietnam after 
World War II. A communist uprising had occurred in the northern section of 
Vietnam, led by Soviet trained Ho Chi Minh. Ho had persistently tried to obtain 
international support for recognition, but failed in his attempts. “After Ho Chi 
Minh seized Hanoi, but before the French were to return, he expected allied 
support to prevent the restoration of French colonial rule in Indochina..., but none 
of the leaders replied to his appeals and none stepped forward to prevent the 
return of the French.”®®
To the contrary, the United States aided the French by recognizing their 
anticommunist puppet ruler Bao Dai, and by "paying for the French war effort in 
Indochina.”®̂ The United States paid the French via the Marshall Plan. Between 
1950-54, the United States had provided France more than $2.6 billion in military 
aid.®® Nevertheless, Ho and the Vietminh in 1954 defeated the French at the 
decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu. On May 8 the French garrison surrendered to 
the Vietminh after a brutal beating.®® The Eisenhower administration drew up a 
plan for intervention, but it received little support in Washington so it was never 
initiated. Congress was suspect of the possibility of getting involved, and
®°William J. Duiker, Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam 
(Boston: McGraw Hill, 1995), 53.
^^Schulzinger, U.S. Diolomacv Since 1900, 236.
®^George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 
(Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002), 51.
®®Schulzinger, U.S. Diolomacv Since 1900. 237.
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Eisenhower was “sensitive to Truman’s fate in Korea, and was unwilling to act 
without backing from Congress.” Congress was unusually stubborn. 
“Congressmen insisted that there must be no more Koreas, with the United 
States furnishing ninety percent of the manpower.”®" Then again, this was not a 
denial for the president to use force. Instead, it was a concern about not letting 
this evolve into a catastrophe and giving the executive enough room to hang 
himself. In the end, the United States’ “distrust of France” dictated not going “to 
war in support of colonialism.”®®
With the French defeat, the first Indochina War ended with the Geneva Peace 
Accords of 1954. They stipulated that Ho and the Vietminh gain control of 
Vietnam, north of the nineteenth parallel and that the country was to be split in 
two and elections were to be held within two years to reunite the country. By the 
summer of 1955, it had become clear that elections were not going to take place 
when the President of South Vietnam Ngo Dinh Diem called off the election 
“arguing the South never signed the Geneva agreement.” John Foster Dulles 
was relieved, since he “did not believe Diem could defeat Ho Chi Minh in a free 
election anyway.”®®
The United States did not intervene at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, but Eisenhower 
and Dulles continued to believe that the security of Southeast Asia was at stake 
in Vietnam. Following the French departure, the United States developed the
®‘*Herring, America’s Longest War. 40.
®®lbid.,41.
®®Schulzinger, U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900, 238.
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Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1955. Its membership included 
Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Thailand, and the United States; Vietnam and Cambodia were protocol states. 
They were not official members but were protected under the treaty organization. 
Its purpose, similar to that of NATO, was to “oppose further communist gains in 
Southeast Asia.”®̂ SEATO also served to sanction the United States presence in 
Vietnam. That would later become an issue of legality and discussion.
After the creation of SEATO and the withdrawal of the French, the United 
States was left to fill the void in South Vietnam. “In early 1956, the United States 
assumed from France full responsibility for training the two hundred-fifty 
thousand poorly organized, trained and equipped South Vietnamese Army.”®®
The United States had been supplying the South Vietnamese government with 
foreign aid since the late 1940s, and that was not going to end with the French 
defeat. Vietnam became a primary focus for some politicians. Senator John F. 
Kennedy (D-Mass.) proclaimed in 1956 “Vietnam represents the cornerstone of 
the free world in Southeast Asia.”®®
The United States’ financial obligations to Diem’s government expanded after 
the Geneva Peace Accords and further entrenched the United States in 
Southeast Asia. From “1955 to 1961, the United States poured more than $1 
billion in economic and military assistance in South Vietnam”, but “over 78
®^Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia (Columbia 
Uniyersity Press, 2004). www.infoolease.com/ce6/history/A0846053.html
®®Herring, America’s Longest War. 70.
®®lbid., 52.
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percent of that assistance went for military purposes.” ®̂® The United State’s 
patronage “enabled the South Vietnamese to survive the first few critical years 
after independence,” but the “massive infusion of American aid....fostered 
dependency rather than laying the foundation for independence.” ®̂̂
By the time John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, the United States had spent 
billions of dollars attempting to secure South Vietnam’s sovereignty. The young 
President quickly established himself as a strong cold warrior. According to 
historian Gabriel Kolko, Kennedy was able to “merge the domino and credibility 
theories into a unified conception.” ®̂® The domino theory, articulated by 
President Eisenhower in 1954, declared that if one country fell to communism 
then other countries would collapse like dominos, and the credibility theory 
acknowledged that the United States had to promote its global image as a 
defender of freedom and that it would defend its ideals. This stance won 
Kennedy the presidency, but it also showed that he was more unlikely to permit 
Vietnam to fall to communism than either Truman or Eisenhower.^®® He routinely 
committed $42 million to support an expansion of the South Vietnamese Army, 
because according to the President, “Vietnam was vital to America’s global 
interests.” ®̂"
' “ ibid., 69, 74.
’°'lbid., 74-75.
^°^Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern 
Historical Experience (New York: The New Press, 1985), 112.
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^°'*lbid., 92-93.
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Kennedy began to divert the United State’s resources toward escalated 
involvement in Vietnam. By Spring 1961, the administration increased military 
advisors by 100 and ultimately dispatched over 400 new Special Force troops to 
Vietnam to train the South Vietnamese Army. The Kennedy administration also 
instituted “Project Beefup.” The project was to double the military assistance to 
South Vietnam and add over 300 new military aircraft. In addition to increased 
military expenditures, the number of military advisors jumped from 3,205 in 
December 1961 to over 9,000 by the end of 1962.^°®
The administration’s view on the future of the South Vietnamese government 
began to waiver early in 1963. Roger Hilsman, advisor to the President, and 
Kenneth O’Donnell, a White House staffer, were sent to Vietnam on a fact finding 
mission. In their report, the two administration officials concluded that the 
“United States and South Vietnam were probably winning but quickly added that 
the war would probably last longer than we would like and cost more in terms of 
both lives and money than we had anticipated.” ®̂® This report would further the 
claim made by O’Donnell and Hilsman that in the summer of 1963, Kennedy 
“recognized the futility of American involvement” in Vietnam and he “was 
prepared to liquidate it as soon as he was reelected.” ®̂̂
By summer, Washington had grown tired of Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother 
Ngo Dinh Nhu. The administration enacted a policy of “selective pressures,”
'°®lbid., 111. 
’ °^lbid., 113.
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whereby Washington cut off aid to South Vietnam in hopes of changing Diem’s 
regime and revamping and stabilizing the South’s government.^®® What Kennedy 
began to realize was that for the South to succeed, the regime needed to 
change. On August 29, Kennedy signed off on the coup to get rid of the 
Ngo’s."®® The first attempt to remove Diem was not initiated because of mixed 
singles from Washington, but the South’s generals were successful on November 
1, 1963. The army removed Diem and Nhu from power, and they were murdered 
on November 2 in the back of an armored personnel carrier. According to 
historian George Herring, “with the coup, the United States assumed direct 
responsibility for the South Vietnamese government.”” ®
Kennedy was not able to see if the South Vietnamese government might 
succeed where the Diem’s failed. Three weeks following Diem’s demise. 
President Kennedy was assassinated during a motorcade ride in downtown 
Dallas. Lyndon Baines Johnson was inaugurated as the new President aboard 
Air Force One following Kennedy’s death. Johnson was now responsible for the 
U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. As Herring concluded “Kennedy 
bequeathed to his successor a problem eminently more dangerous than the one 
he had inherited.”” ^
’ °®lbid., 123.
^°®Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chase for Peace and the Escalation of War 
in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 43, 64.
^'“Herring, America's Longest War. 129.
”̂ lbid., 129.
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One of Johnson’s first major initiatives was to approve a plan that would 
“progressively escalate pressure....to inflict increasing punishment upon North 
Vietnam.”” ® OPLAN-34A was approved by the President on January 16, 1964, 
and it consisted of three phases, each more punitive, and was directed by the 
military. The operations consisted of “intelligence over flights, the dropping of 
propaganda leaflets, and commando raids by South Vietnamese forces.” ” ® 
OPLAN-34A also “utilized South Vietnamese or hired personnel that was 
supported by U.S. training and logistical efforts, ” during its “June-July 
operations.” ” " The operations plan also employed the Desoto patrols which led 
to the infamous Gulf of Tonkin incidents and resolution. According to historian 
Gabriel Kolko, the “Desoto patrols ran electronic intelligence missions in the 
Tonkin Gulf as close as four miles” of North Vietnam.” ® These OPLAN-34A 
operations helped to create an atmosphere in which the United States’ 
aggressive policies increasingly agitated the North Vietnamese. President 
Johnson had inherited an increasingly hostile situation. He proceeded to 
escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam and executive dominance in Washington.
The policies defined under Truman and Eisenhower were agreed to by a 
willing if not sometimes reluctant Congress. The executive had taken control and 
initiated policy and Congress had consented out of fear of communism and lack 
of a viable set of counter arguments or policies. “The administration of Harry
^^^Logevall, Choosing War. 93. 
"®lbid., 94, 110.
" ' ‘Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 124.
"®lbid., 123.
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Truman set the broad outlines and developed the rationale for the policies, and 
forged the consensus to support them. Eisenhower broadened the consensus 
and extended the policies, and the Kennedy-Johnson administrations pressed 
them to their fullest implementation. In other words, in the Cold War years of 
debate over the fundamentals of foreign policy was not really a legitimate 
activity.”” ®
Senator Fulbright commented that “it was no light matter to vote against the 
president’s request and there-by reveal to the world disunity and weakness which 
has often been characteristic of our system.””  ̂ The executive initiated and 
Congress followed along, giving the president so much authority in foreign policy 
that to reclaim it would have caused a strong backlash. Moreover, congressmen 
“had come to believe-or at least had publicly proclaimed-that the president ought 
to control American foreign policy.”” ® These believes, practices, and precedents 
went far toward explaining the Congress’s response to the Gulf of Tonkin incident 
and resolution that followed.
"®Gary W . Reichard, “D ivisions and Dissent: Democrats and Foreign Policy, 1952-1956,' 
in To Advise and Consent: The United States Congress and Foreign Policy in the Twentieth 
Century ed. Joel FI Silbey (Brooklyn, New York: Carlson Publishing, 1991), 293.
"^Reichard, “Divisions and Dissent: Democrats and Foreign Policy, 1952-1956,” 285. 
Also in Fulbright to John T. Caldwell, January 28, 1955, BCN 46.
"®lbid., 275.
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CHAPTER IV
THE GULF OF TONKIN AND 
RESOLUTION
The Gulf of Tonkin was a pivotal incident for the United States and Vietnam. 
The early days of August 1964 climaxed events that had been set in motion for 
ten years since Dien Bien Phu and almost twenty years since the beginning of 
the Cold War. These actions propelled an already weak Congress to sign 
legislation giving all necessary powers to the president in hopes that it could stop 
an all out war. What it really did was to escalate the war the longest in United 
States history.
As acknowledged in the United States Constitution, the president does have 
the power to repel invasions and attacks on the United States people and 
property, but the circumstances that surrounded these attacks are alarming. It 
still cannot be proven that the C. Turner Jov and the Maddox were actually ever 
attacked on August 4, propelling the United States into a war-like mentality. It 
was clear that the administration was intent on defeating the Communists at all 
costs. In a letter sent to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge on December 12,
1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated that the president wanted 
plans and recommendations as follows: “Covert operations by the South
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Vietnamese forces, utilizing such supports of United States forces as is 
necessary, against North Vietnam. Plans for such operations should include 
varying levels of pressure all designed to make clear to the North Vietnamese 
that the United States will not accept a Communist victory in South Vietnam and 
that we will escalate the conflict to whatever level is required to ensure their 
defeat.”” ® The administration was determined not to let the South fall under the 
Communist rule.
The Johnson administration was so bent on holding firm in Vietnam that it was 
not always truthful in its approach to Congress. President Lyndon Johnson and 
his cabinet (left-overs from the Kennedy administration), deliberately misled or 
withheld critical information from the Congress. The legislature, minus a few 
dissenting members, granted the President authority that would rival that of a 
monarch. The reading of the Tonkin Resolution reasserted the President’s 
control over foreign affairs and delivered a crushing blow from which Congress 
has yet to recover. Johnson’s message to the people on August 6, 1964, 
illustrated his administration’s idea that Congress was ill-equipped to decisively 
handle foreign matters in a way that the executive could. Nevertheless, the 
information about the battles on August 4, 1964, are scattered at best with results 
that possibly never happened. The Gulf of Tonkin incident provided a gateway 
for full involvement by the United States in Vietnam.
There are several versions of what transpired in early August 1964 in the Gulf 
of Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam. On August 2 the U.S.S. Maddox, an
"®Edwin E. Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 5.
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American destroyer, was running De Soto patrols (the destroyer ran zig-zag 
patterns off the coast of North Vietnam in an attempt to intercept radio 
communications, but the Pentagon claimed the Maddox was running routine 
patrols in international waters), when it was, “intercepted by three North 
Vietnamese patrol boats...which had mistaken the Maddox for a South 
Vietnamese escort vessel.” ®̂® It was a Sunday and the Maddox was on “holiday 
routine,” ®̂̂ and its crew was caught off guard.
The three patrol boats approached the destroyer twenty-eight miles off the 
coast at mid-afternoon on August 2. There was conflicting evidence that the 
Maddox might have only been sixteen-eighteen miles from the North Vietnamese 
coast. “The Maddox’s logs indicate that the torpedo boats appeared on the 
radar, coming out from Han Me, at about 1430.” ®̂® The North Vietnamese PT 
boats fired upon the Maddox, “inflecting minor damage.” ®̂® As soon as word 
came that the destroyer was under attack, the U.S.S. Ticonderoqa launched four 
F-8E aircraft to provide air cover and support for the vessel. The North 
Vietnamese PT boats were repelled, and one PT boat limped away severely 
damaged by the Maddox and the F-8E aircraft.^®" The only damage to the
‘ ^°The Senator Gravel Edition, Ttie Pentagon Papers: Ttie Defense Department Historv 
of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam. 4 Vol. (Boston: Beacon Press) III, 184.
‘^‘ Moise, Tonkin Gulf and tfie Escalation of the Vietnam War, 73.
‘^Ibid., 75.
^^®Logevall, Choosing War. 197.
‘ '̂‘The Pentagon Papers. Ill, 184.
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destroyer was one hole made by a bullet from a 14.5 mm machine gun.̂ ®® There 
was no dispute about this attack; it did happen.
The first incident infuriated Johnson. He decided to withhold any retaliation, 
but vowed “if they decide to do it again, they’ll get another sting.” ®̂® The U.S.S. 
Maddox was ordered to resume its “normal” patrols in the gulf the following day. 
The President met with American foreign language newspaper publishers and 
editors and announced he had ordered the Navy to double its destroyer force off 
North Vietnam and to provide sufficient air cover to destroy any attacking 
force.^®  ̂ The Maddox was to be accompanied by the C. Turner Jov. Paul H. 
Nitze, Secretary of the Navy, praised the Maddox for “holding off and damaging 
the North Vietnamese torpedo boats that attacked her in the area yesterday.” ®̂® 
Returning the patrols to the same region might not have deliberately provoked a 
North Vietnamese attack, but “it did not go out of its way to avoid one either.” ®̂®
At 1940 hours, on August 4, Task Group 72.1 (Maddox and C. Turner Jov) 
radioed back to the Seventh Fleet that they were under imminent attack. At the 
time of the supposed attack, the weather was poor; it varied from a drizzle to 
thunderstorms in a very dark night, which caused the radar/sonar to malfunction. 
The Task Group intercepted communications that the North Vietnamese were 
under direct orders to attack the patrol. After learning of the communications, the
‘^®Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. 79.
‘^®Herrlng, America's Longest War, 142.
‘ '̂’New York Times, “Washington Proceedings,” August 4, 1964, p.16.
‘ ®̂New York Times, “Nitz Says the Maddox Acquitted Herself Well,” August 3, 1964, p.7. 
‘^®Herring, America's Longest War, 142.
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U.S.S. Ticonderoqa launched F-8’s and A-4D’s to provide air cover for the two 
destroyers/®®
At 2035, the destroyers had reported “radar sightings.” At 2134 the ships 
thought that they had pin-pointed new surface contacts that the task group 
deemed hostile. “It was well known that certain types of weather have the ability 
to generate radar images.” ®̂̂ At 2140, the Maddox opened fire and at 2142 the 
aircraft from the Ticonderoqa began their assault on the targets, but just before 
the aircraft began its onslaught one of the PT boats reportedly launched a 
torpedo. A seaman on the C. Turner Jov claimed to see the torpedo three- 
hundred feet off the port beam. The alleged battle lasted approximately an hour, 
and the destroyers reported that two enemy boats were sunk and reported no 
casualties or damage to the U.S. vessels.^®®
President Johnson might have had a great cause to use force to prevent 
future hostilities if the attacks were truly unprovoked, but the North Vietnamese 
felt the belligerent intrusions by the United States justified their defensive tactics. 
This was not the first time the United States had entered North Vietnamese 
territory. First, the De Soto patrols consisted of the Maddox doing “Zig Zag” 
patterns off the coast of North Vietnam. Prior to its arrival in the Gulf, the 
Maddox picked up eavesdropping technology in order to listen to enemy 
communications. Second, OPLAN-34 had provoked the relations between the
‘®°The Pentagon Papers, III, 184.
131 Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, 107.
"^Ibid., 184-85.
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United States and North Vietnam. Johnson endorsed the plan on January 16, 
1964. “The plan was used to escalate pressure...to Inflict Increasing punishment 
upon North Vietnam” with the objective of convincing Hanoi to “desist from Its 
aggressive pollcles.”^̂  ̂ While the Maddox was operating In the gulf, the South 
Vietnamese were conducting raids on islands off shore and under the direction of 
the United States. That was OPLAN-34. The raids and naval patrols worked In 
conjunction, and without the authorization and knowledge of Congress. The 
United States State Department denied involvement In any attacks against the 
North Vietnamese, and Robert J. McCloskey, the State Department spokesman, 
said the “Incident was serious, adding that anytime anywhere that an American 
ship Is attacked for ‘unprovoked’ reasons, that In our view Is a serious 
incldent.”^̂ '̂  The question would persist whether this was an unprovoked attack.
The second assault on August 4 was highly suspect. There was no direct 
evidence to support such an attack ever occurred. As previously mentioned, the 
Maddox and the C. Turner Jov were bombarded by a heavy storm In the pitch 
black of night that In all likelihood crippled their radar instruments. The captain of 
the Maddox was unsure of an attack and declared that “evidence of an attack 
was less than concluslve.”^̂ ® Historian Fredrik Logevall commented on the 
attack saying that “physical evidence for a second Incident Is exceedingly slight, 
whereas the evidence that It did not occur Is very s t r o n g . I n  the official
'^^Logevall, Choosing War. 93.
York Times. “Johnson Orders Attackers Sunk,” Page 1 Col. 
^^®Herring, America’s Longest War. 142.
^^^Logevall. Choosing War. 198.
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records, there was no substantial evidence or documentation that proved the 
second barrage ever actually took place, and thus circumstantial evidence is 
p len t i f u l .A f te r  the early August attacks in the Gulf, “experimentation revealed 
during high-speed maneuvers that the destroyer’s own propeller and or rudder 
produced the sort of noise spokes that had been interpreted as torpedoes.”^̂® 
This new Information facilitated an Increase in the belief that the attacks of 
August 4, never transpired.
What probably did occur was the Maddox and the C. Turner Jov were 
shooting at ghosts In the dark. One of the pilots of the jets from the TIconderoqa. 
James B. Stockdale, reported that he did not witness anything. “He did not see 
any boats, wakes, ricochet of boats, boat Impacts, or torpedo w a k e s . T w o  
other pilots. Commander George Edmondson and his wingman. Lieutenant Jere 
Barton, were flying two A-1 Skyraiders. They filed reports on August 7 as a reply 
to a JSC message regarding what they observed on August 4. They reported 
“no visual sightings of any vessels or wakes other than Turner Jov and Maddox. 
Wakes from Turner Jov and Maddox were visible for 2-3000 yards.” The pilots 
also “fired ordinance In areas where skunks reported and In areas where directed 
by con t ro l l e rs .Desp i te  the inconsistency of the reports, the White House
^^^Eugene G. Windchy, Tonkin Gulf (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 
1971), 294.
^^ ÎVIoise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. 143.
^^®Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford and Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign 
Relations: A History Since 1895 (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1995), 410.
‘̂'°Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. 186.
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moved to initiate retaliatory strikes against ttie Nortti Vietnamese. Robert 
McNamara, Johnson’s Secretary of Defense, directed the chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Earle Wheeler to make “damn sure the attacks had taken 
place.”̂ "̂^
On August 4 President Johnson had breakfast with sixteen leading members 
of Congress to discuss the Incident and the assistance the President would need 
to retaliate against the aggressors. The meeting lasted for elghty-nlne minutes. 
During the session, Johnson advised the congressional leaders that he was 
going to ask for a resolution and Congress’s support for his policies concerning 
military force In V i e t na m .J ohn so n  did not disclose anything relating to 
OPLAN-34 or the De Soto patrols. It would seem that he intentionally misled the 
congressional leaders to give the appearance that North Vietnam alone had 
committed these hostile attacks. All the same, the congressional leaders failed 
to ask If there were any provocations for the attacks. Perhaps the congressmen 
simply did not wish to know.
At some point In the meeting, Johnson and the congressional members 
discussed how, if the United States failed to act. It would Impact the nation’s 
prestige around the globe. Johnson commented on the option of not retaliating 
against the North by stating that “we can tuck out tails and run.” '̂̂  ̂ They all 
understood that the United States needed to send a message to the world that
'̂‘Ventagon Papers. Ill, 184-85.
^"^Ibid., 186.
‘̂*^Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, 212.
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the people and Its government stood behind their president and it would give him 
the power to maintain the United States’ Influence. Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk said to the President “we need to make It as clear as we can that we are 
not going to run out of Southeast Asia, but that we have no national ambitions 
not either In a war to the north. They made that choice themselves.” '̂*'̂  Senator 
Bourke B. HIckenlooper (R-IA), observed that “there should be no doubt as to 
whether the President should have the right to order the Armed Forces Into 
action. My feeling Is It Is up to the President to prepare the kind and type of 
resolution he believes would be proper. It Is up to Congress to say whether they 
will pass It or not. I have no doubt in my mind that concrete action would be 
t a k e n . I n  the end, the congressional response was only “how Congress could 
show Its agreement and concern In the crisis.” "̂*®
President Johnson did make some obligatory remarks about the need for 
congressional support. “I wanted to get congressional concurrence. I think It 
would be very damaging to ask for It and not get But the President was 
well aware of the power he possessed, and the perception people had of the 
executive. “I don’t think any resolution Is necessary, but I think it is a lot better to 
have it in the light of what we did in K o r e a . J o h n s o n  preserved the power of
‘̂*‘’David M. Barrett ed., Lyndon B. Johnson’s Vietnam Papers: A Documentary 
Collection (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1997), 67.
^"^Ibid., 69.
‘̂'^Pentagon Papers, III, 186.
’“’^David M. Barrett ed., Lyndon B. Johnson’s Vietnam Papers. 69.
'^®lbid.,71.
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the presidency in this meeting, and the only thing the leaders of Congress did 
was to show their support--to “rally around the flag.” The Speaker of the House 
said “I think Congress has a responsibility and should show a united front to the 
w o r l d . S o  what was their responsibility: to follow and obey? Even Senator 
William Fulbright (D-AR), who became one of the most outspoken critics of the 
war and the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, said “I will support you.”^̂ °
At the close of the meeting the congressional leaders bonded together to 
support President Johnson’s resolution. Congressman George B. Aiken (R-VT), 
admitted that “by the time you send it up there won’t be anything for us to do but 
support you.”^̂  ̂ The resolution marked the beginning of congressional surrender 
of its constitutional obligation to the nation to retain control over the declaration of 
war in Vietnam, but it also increased the strength of the President. “The 
President rushed forward with plans for a dramatic telecast, plans for gathering 
congressional leaders, and plans for securing passage of a blank check for war 
(prepared in advance of the crisis).”^̂  ̂ The resolution expanded presidential war 
powers and make it virtually impossible to restore previous congressional checks 
on the executive-as if it had not already been eroded by nineteen years of Cold 
War policy.
H b id ., 71.
’ ^°lbid., 72. This was an interesting connotation since Fulbright was instrumental in 
helping to investigate the Tonkin incidents and shed light on the entry into Vietnam and the 
legitimacy of the war and the resolution in which he helped pass.
^® l̂bid., 72.
^®^WIndchy, Tonkin Gulf. 299.
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On the evening of August 4,1964, President Johnson addressed the people 
of the United States and declared that the North Vietnamese had aggressively 
attacked the Maddox and G. Turner Jov in international waters. He told the 
people that he was sending a resolution to Congress regarding the authorization 
to defend the United States against aggression and to prevent further attacks in 
Southeast Asia. The next day, August 5, Johnson dispatched a message to 
Congress urging them to pass a resolution “to support freedom and in protecting 
peace in Southeast Asia.”^̂ ^
Johnson claimed that the United States policies in Southeast Asia had 
remained consistent since 1954. The American mission was to secure peace in 
the region. Johnson concluded his message to Congress by affirming his 
intention to maintain the principles of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO), and in doing so, the president sought “no wider war.” He merely 
wanted to “bring about the end of communist subversion and aggression in the 
a re a ;i*
On August 6, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Wheeler met in an 
Executive Session before the Senate Joint Foreign Relations and Armed 
Services Committee to discuss the events of August 2 and 4. In the closed 
meeting, Wheeler, Rusk, and McNamara denied that OPLAN-34 and the De Soto
^®^Lyndon B. Johnson, “The Gulf of Tonkin Message 1964,” in Historic Documents on the 
Presidency 1776-1989 ed. Michael Nelson (Washington D C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1989), 
364-66.
^^Ibid., 364-66.
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patrols had anything to do with the attacks. They also denied U.S. Naval 
involvement in the South Vietnamese attacks on the North. When they briefed 
the senators on the incident on August 6, they gave the senators a simple 
picture, of unprovoked attack against United States ships on the high seas.^^®
The administration was not forthcoming in its knowledge of the events that 
almost certainly provoked the Tonkin incidents. Senator William Fulbright later 
stated “in short, the all-important briefings of August 6 were a mockery of the 
legislative process. The senate committees did not even find out the Maddox 
was on an intelligence pat ro l .Admin is t ra t ion official claimed they knew of no 
attacks in which the United States Navy had acted in or plotted against North 
Vietnam by the South. The administration reiterated that the Maddox was on a 
“routine patrol and the attacks were deliberate and unprovoked.
The White House had practiced a policy of deception. As historian Eugene G. 
Windchy asserts, “had the facts become known, senators would not have 
handled the Tonkin Gulf resolution so carelessly.”^̂ ® Johnson’s administration 
needed a way to show the President as a hard-liner toward communism. After 
all, the presidential election was only three months away and he was being 
challenged by Republican Barry Goldwater, an acknowledged hawk on foreign
^®®Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, 86. 
^®®Windchy, Tonkin Gulf, 299.
^ '̂^Logevali, Choosing War. 203.
^®®Winclchy, Tonkin Gulf. 300.
50
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
policy. Political pressure demanded that he prove to the nation that he could be 
a decisive leader.̂ ®®
All the same, the congressional leaders’ promises to the President during their 
conference on August 4, make the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was 
a certainty. It took three days for a resolution to pass through Congress. SJ 
Resolution 189 was pushed through the Senate by the Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, J. William Fulbright.^®° The measure passed 
unanimously (416-0) in the House, with only forty minutes of debate. In the 
Senate, there was only minimal opposition to the resolution, and the measure 
passed by an overwhelming margin of 88-2. Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon 
put up the biggest fight, but with no results. According to Stanley Karnow, Morse 
carried little weight in the Senate and Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY) referred to 
Morse’s attitude that “you can’t get into the fight with the president at a time when 
the flags are w a v i n g . M o r s e ’s main protest was that this “pending resolution 
tinkers with and impairs the great, procedural rights of the American people 
written in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution-that the power and right to 
declare war is vested in the Congress and not the President of the United 
States.”^ S e n a t o r  Ernest Gruening of Alaska was the other dissenting voice
^®®Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. 211.
'®°Linda McFarland, Cold War Strategist: Stuart Symington and the Search for National 
Security (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2001), 124.
^®Uacob K. Jayits, "The Congressional Presence in Foreign Affairs,” Foreign Affairs 49 
(July 1971): 223-24.
®̂̂Congressional Record, 110 (6-7 August 1964): 18444. Summary of the debate on the 
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Briefing book of Secretary Dean Rusk’s appearance before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, courtesy of the Virtual 
Vietnam Archiye at Texas Tech Uniyersity.
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who voted against the resolution because it presented an “unlimited authorization 
for war anywhere in Southeast Asia.” ®̂̂ On August 10, 1964 President Johnson 
signed the resolution into law.
The resolution was unnerving. It provided for the President to maintain peace 
in Southeast Asia without a time limit, but it also authorized the “president to take 
all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the 
United States and to prevent further aggression.” It stated that such actions were 
“vital to the national interest.” Finally, the resolution asserted that it would “expire 
when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is 
reasonably assured by international conditions.” ®̂'’
The resolution assured the president that he could wage war at his discretion 
and for as long as he desired. He was given a “blank check” to do what he 
thought was necessary to secure freedom in Southeast Asia. Johnson referred 
to the resolution “like grandma’s nightshirt...it covered everything. ” He also 
commented that with his new power and popularity he “didn’t just screw Ho Chi 
Minh, I cut his pecker off.” ®̂® Johnson was granted this power in part because he 
promised that this would be a “limited and fitting response so that involvement 
seemed minimal.” According to author Linda McFarland, “hawks like Stuart 
Symington (D-MO) never doubted, at this point, the legitimacy of the action 
taken.”’®®
’®®lbid„ 18444.
164,Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, August 10, 1964. Public Law 88-408; 78 Stat. 384. 
^®\ogevail. Choosing War. 205.
^®®McFarland, Cold War Strategist. 125.
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The events of August 4 can leave a bitter taste in the mouth. On one hand, it 
would appear that the administration wanted there to be an attack and so 
portrayed it as one. If Johnson and his advisors could sustain the legitimacy of 
the attack, then the administration could justify a larger intrusion into the war. At 
this time, they believed winning the war was within reach. “It appeared to certain 
strategists that the war could yet be won if only a bigger effort were made, 
drawing directly on the limitless potential of American might.”’ ®̂ On the other 
hand, given the technology of the time, it could be asserted that they were simply 
acting on the best available intelligence. Nevertheless, the administration’s 
response to the Senate was puzzling. The attacks on August 2 were verified, so 
North Vietnamese aggression had already been established. Why rely so much 
on the attack of August 4? The legislature was entitled to information.
The deception may not have been deliberate, but it shows that the 
administration disregarded protocols and was sloppy in its intelligence gathering. 
In addition. Congress fell for it hook, line and sinker. Senator Fulbright was later 
quoted as saying that if Congress would have known, it would have examined 
the information more methodically. Investigative authority belongs to Congress.
It could have easily waited and investigated the August 4 events more 
thoughtfully and deliberately, but with the elections looming over its head. 
Congress felt the political pressure to take a firm stand in defense of the United 
States.
’®^Windchy, Tonkin Gulf, 300.
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The American people were misled by the administration. The evidence of the 
attack was circumstantial at best, and yet Congress authorized an open-ended 
resolution. Observers can decide for themselves whether the executive abused 
the power derived from the resolution or if Congress proved unwilling to exercise 
its control over foreign affairs. Congress became the rubber stamp for foreign 
affairs during Vietnam; but who was really deceived? In a column 
commemorating the thirty-year anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, two 
journalists observed that “we Americans are the ultimate innocents. We are 
forever desperate to believe that this time the government is telling us the 
truth.”’®® Maybe that applied to senators as well.
Cohen and Norman Solomon, “30-Year Anniversary; Tonkin Gulf Lie Launched 
Vietnam War,” (Media Beat: July 27, 1994), 3.
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CHAPTER V
JOHNSON’S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR 
THE RESOLUTION 
Why should President Johnson believe that he did not actually “need” a 
resolution or declaration from Congress to go to war against North Vietnam? 
Thanks to a system that was largely constructed by past presidents and the 
courts, Johnson saw it as an important step, but not sufficiently crucial to veto his 
intentions. Congress’s approval was a mere affirmation of Johnson’s request 
and did not result from a thorough debate of the issues at hand. Throughout 
U.S. history, the executive and the judicial branch have provided a means for 
future presidents to expedite their powers and forgo certain restrictions in the 
name of peace, security and the ever evolving technology. Acts of previous 
presidents and judicial rulings not only provided Johnson with the means of 
retaliating, but also prevented lawsuits from questioning his use offeree during 
his tenure in Vietnam.
There were two important presidential precedents that have been used 
repeatedly to sustain the executive’s actions abroad. The first incident occurred 
shortly after Thomas Jefferson assumed the role of commander in chief following 
the1800 election. This precedent dealt with the Barbary pirates, but it was not 
Jefferson’s first encounter with them. In 1785, after arriving in Paris to negotiate
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treaties between his new country and the European powers, Jefferson, John 
Adams and Benjamin Franklin were forced to discuss the issue of the Barbary 
pirates.’®® Even back in 1785 Jefferson argued for using force rather than paying 
a tribute to these international criminals. He believed that, “money would only 
buy an uneasy peace and lead to higher and higher demands.”’ ®̂
The day before Jefferson took office on March 4, 1801, Congress passed a 
statute providing for a “naval peace establishment” to deal with these pirates. 
Within his first week of office, Jefferson was obligated to negotiate with the 
“Barbary Coast Pirates.” The Barbary pirates regularly captured ships as prizes 
and either enslaved the seamen or held them for ransom. They also “prowled” 
the Mediterranean like “sea wolves” searching for their Christian enemies in an 
attempt to promote their Muslim ideals and faith.’^’ The practice of paying 
annual bribes (tributes) to four states in Northern Africa, Morocco, Algiers, Tunis 
and Tripoli, had been the policy of Jefferson’s predecessors. Both George 
Washington and John Adams had paid nearly $10 million in tributes during their 
years in office.’ ®̂ The “Barbary bandits” received similar tributes (payoffs) from 
other countries such as Great Britain, France, Sweden and Denmark. The British 
shelled out as much as a quarter million dollars a year, and had been paying
^®®Robert Leckie, From Sea to Shining Sea: From the War of 1812 to the Mexican War, 
the Saga of America's Expansion (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 38.
^^°lbid., 38.
'"'ibid., 30.
'"^Louls Fisher, “The Barbary Wars: Legal Precedent for Invading Haiti,” in The 
Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy ed. David Gray Adler and Larry N. 
George (Kansas; University of Kansas Press, 1996), 314.
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tribute on and off since 1646. According to historian Robert Leckie, “these 
payments were not tribute-but naked extortion extracted under the threat of 
f o r c e . J e f f e r s o n  had to decide whether or not the United States could afford 
this extortion. The President assembled his cabinet on March 9, 1801 to discuss 
the issue. The cabinet was divided, with some members “advocating the 
dispatch of a squadron to the Mediterranean to protect American shipping.” 
“Others warned that only Congress-not the executive-could declare war.”’ '̂’
On May 15, after two months of debate, Jefferson dispatched troops to Tripoli 
to halt the seizing of American ships. In the event that Barbary powers declared 
war on the United States, American vessels were ordered to “protect our 
commerce and chastise their insolence-by sinking, burning or destroying their 
ships and vessels wherever you shall find them.”’ ®̂ Before the dispatching of 
troops, Jefferson had been informed that Bashaw Yusuf Karamanli of Tripoli, 
ordered his soldiers to chop down the American flagpole at the United States 
Consulate in response to Jefferson’s discontinuance of the tributes. After 
receiving this information, Jefferson decided that there was “no necessity for 
America to respond with its own declaration.”’ '"'’ The act itself was a declaration 
of war.
'"®Leckie, From Sea to Shining Sea. 32.
'" “ ibid., 39.
'"®Naval Documents Relating to the United States War with the Barbary Powers 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939), 467.
'"®Leckie, From Sea to Shining Sea, 38-39.
’""ibid., 38-39.
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Jefferson did not inform Congress about the demands of the pasha until 
December 8, 1801. The leader of Tripoli warned that “unless the United States 
paid tribute, Tripoli would seize American ships and citizens.”’ ®̂ Jefferson asked 
for direction from Congress. He stated that he was unauthorized by the 
Constitution, without sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense.’ ®̂
He justified his actions on the foundation that Congress had passed ten separate 
statutes in the preceding years with the latest on March 3, 1801, authorizing 
military operations. Nonetheless, he had already sent troops before receiving 
specific authorization for this event.
Jefferson had not asked for congressional confirmation partly because 
Congress had already recessed by May, and Jefferson refused to convene a 
special session of Congress. Nor did he want a battle with Congress so early in 
his administration. He had observed this issue of tributes for sixteen years and 
his inclination towards using force had not changed in that time. He had 
proclaimed as Secretary of State that the use of force was apparent and as 
president he refused to negotiate with pirates. Jefferson might have been a 
“strict constitutionalist,” but he set the foundations for future presidents in the use 
of force abroad.
The second example of presidential action and congressional absence from 
the authorization process transpired only fourteen years before the Gulf of Tonkin 
incident. It involved Harry S. Truman’s use of the United Nations to gain
’ "®Fisher, “The Barbary Wars,” 315. 
’ "®lbid.,315.
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entrance into the Korean conflict. Truman sought to defend South Korea against 
its Communist aggressors from the North. On June 25, 1950, the North Koreans 
(thought to be directed by Moscow) crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and invaded 
South Korea. At the urging of the United States, the United Nations Security 
Council met on June 26 to condemn the actions of the North. On that same day, 
Truman ordered United States air and sea forces to give South Koreans cover 
and support.’®® He also emphasized that the Security Council had issued an 
order for the North Koreans to return north of the 38’® parallel. Truman asserted 
that, “in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council, the United States 
will vigorously support the effort of the Council to terminate this serious breach of 
the peace.”’®’
The administration used the United Nations condemnation for committing 
troops without prior approval from Congress, and on June 29, Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson claimed that all United States actions taken in Korea had been 
under the aegis of the United Nations. Yet, Truman had committed United States 
forces a day before the council called for military action.’ ®̂ The Security Council 
did not call for the use of force until June 27. This chronology raises questions 
about Truman’s legal authority for committing troops without prior approval. 
Moreover, the Security Council’s 9-0 vote in favor of incursion into Korea was
’®°Pubiic Papers of the Presidents: Harry Truman. 1950 (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1950), 529.
’®’ Louis Fisher, “Truman in Korea,” in The Constitution and the Conduct of American 
Foreign Policy ed. David Gray Adler and Larry N. George (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 
1996), 325. Also in Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry Truman. 1950 (Washington D C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1950), 491.
’® l̂bid., 326. Also in Department of State Bulletin 23 (1950) : 43.
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obtained through dubious pretenses. The approval of the United Nations was 
secured only because the Soviet Union happened to be boycotting the Security 
Council at the time, and the president’s constitutional powers can hardly be tied 
to the ebb and flow of the veto of the Soviet Union in the Security Council.’®®
Truman met with congressional leaders at 11:30a.m. on June 27, only after 
his policies were set and orders issued.’®'’ He did not seek the approval of the 
members of Congress for his military actions in Korea. When asked after he left 
the presidency whether or not he intended to use military force, he replied, “no 
question about it.”’®® Truman saw his decision to commit forces as a presidential 
prerogative to prevent w ar- as opposed to an act initiating hostilities. He used 
the auspices of the U.N. to invoke a state of war on the Korean peninsula, and he 
averted congressional approval for a declaration by committing troops under the 
guise of the United Nations-even though the United States provided 90 percent 
of the manpower and money for the campaign. The suspicious United Nations 
endorsement allowed Truman to engage in war without approaching Congress 
first.
Two resolutions in the 1950s also had a major impact on congressional 
acquiescence in abdicating war powers to the President. The Formosa and the 
Middle East Resolution both relinquished congressional approval over war 
oversight. As historian Robert Mann stated, because of the “reluctance to
’®^Robert Bork, “Comments on the Articles on the Legality of the United States Action in 
Cambodia,” American Journal of International Law 65 (1971): 79, 81.
’®'’ Fisher, “Truman in Korea,” 327.
’^^Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman (New York: 
Berkley, 1974), 297. Also in Louis Fisher, “Truman in Korea,” 327.
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assume responsibility in ttie area of foreign affairs, Congress tiad traditionally 
deferred to the president during foreign emergencies.”’®® In the Formosa 
Resolution, Eisenhower asked Congress for advanced authorization to deploy 
U.S. armed forces abroad, because China had attacked Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Nationalist troops in the Formosa Straits. The House approved the resolution 
410-3 and the Senate approved it 83-3 In January 1955. It allowed the President 
to employ armed forces as he deemed necessary to defend the islands against 
armed attack.’ ®̂
The Middle East resolution, which became known as the Eisenhower 
Doctrine, was passed in 1957. It came in response to France, Britain and Israel 
attacking Egypt over control of the Suez Canal. The United States was also 
concerned that the Soviet Union might enter the fray, so Eisenhower went to 
Congress on January 5, 1957, to request authority to send American troops to 
secure and protect the region from overt armed aggression from any nation 
controlled by international communism.’®® The Senate and the House both 
overwhelmingly passed the measure. There were questions whether Congress 
was abdicating its responsibilities to the executive. Senator John Kennedy (D- 
Mass.) asked if Congress was granting the President the right to use troops 
without coming to Congress first, but Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Mt.) replied that 
“we are not giving him the right. We are reasserting or reaffirming his right
’®®Robert Mann, A Grand Delusion: America’s Descent into Vietnam (New York: Basic
Books, 2001), 203.
’ ’’"ibid., 204. 
’®®ibid., 205.
61
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
already given.”’®® Senator William Fulbright (D-Ark.) also questioned the 
authority given to the President under the Middle East Resolution. He wondered 
if the resolution asked for a “blank grant of power over funds and armed services, 
to be used in a blank way for a blank area.” The resolution “established and 
strengthened the precedent for congressional approval in advance of military 
excursions.” ’®°
Presidential precedent and prior resolutions were only half of the puzzle. The 
judicial branch, on occasion, interpreted the executive’s power to wage war 
under the United States Constitution. The courts have facilitated the growth of 
presidential power in the areas of constitutional theory and governmental practice 
in three interconnected but somewhat different ways. The courts have adhered 
to the “sole-organ” doctrine as propounded in the 1936 case of United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, and the “political-question” doctrine, by 
inferring congressional approval of presidential action by virtue of its inaction or 
silence.’®’ The executive domination of United States foreign affairs represents 
a dramatic shift from the Framers’ understanding of the Constitution.
In 1863, the United States Supreme Court ruled on presidential power in 
cases of sudden attack in the Prize Cases. Even though the Court limited
’®°lbid., 205, 207.
United States v.Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936). David Gray 
Adler, “Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs,” in Ttie Constitution and the Conduct of 
American Foreign Policy ed. David Gray Adler and Larry N. George (Kansas; Uniyersity of 
Kansas Press, 1996), 19-20.
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presidential power in its ruling, the wording of the decision opened the possibility
of the president employing force for defensive purposes. The Court ruled:
By the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare a natural or 
foreign war...If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is 
not only authorized but bound to resist force, by force. He does not initiate the 
war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special 
legislative authority. And whether the hostile party be a foreign invader, or 
States organized in rebellion, it is none the less a war, although the 
declaration of it be “unilateral.”’®®
The decision clarified that it was Congress’ responsibility to initiate hostilities, not
the President’s, but the President possessed “unlimited power to wage war in
defending against a war begun through invasion or rebellion.”’®® Nevertheless,
according to David Gray Adler, the “Court views its role in this area as a support
function for policies already established” and they have “become an arm of the
executive branch.”’®'* The endorsement of legitimate defensive response
illustrated their support for the executive.
The court’s decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation,
has also been regularly cited as a precedent for executive dominance. The
defendants in the case were charged with trying to sell “fifteen machine guns to
Bolivia, a country then engaged in armed conflict in the Chaco, in violation of the
Joint Resolution of Congress approved May 28, 1934.”’®® The case rested upon
a joint resolution that stated it was “unlawful to sell, except under such limitations
and exceptions as the President prescribes, any arms or munitions of war in any
Adler, “Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs,” 25.
’ ®̂“Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat,” 1779. 
’® l̂bid., 20.
^^^United States v.Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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place in the United States to the countries now engaged in that armed conflict 
(Chaco), or to any person, company, or association acting in the interest of either 
country, until otherwise ordered by the President or by Congress.”’®® The 
proclamation was revoked only a year and a half after it was put in effect. In 
deciding on the first charge about whether this resolution was an “invalid 
delegation of legislative power to the executive,” the Court ruled that “in this vast 
external realm the president alone has the power to speak or listen as a 
representative of the nation. He makes treaties and he alone negotiates where 
the Senate cannot intrude. The President is the sole organ of the nation in its 
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”’ ®̂ The Court 
further argued.
The President is the constitutional representative of the United States with 
regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns with foreign nations and 
must necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and upon what 
subjects negotiation may be urged with the greatest prospect of success. For 
his conduct he is responsible for the faithful discharge of his duty. They think 
the interference of the Senate in the direction of foreign negotiations 
calculated to diminish that responsibility and thereby to impair the best 
security for national safety. The nature of transactions with foreign nations, 
requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends on 
secrecy and dispatch.’®®
The decision handed down by Justice George Sutherland reinforced the
executive’s supremacy in external relations and that he alone “initiated” foreign
affairs. As David Gray Adler maintains the Curtiss-Wright Case has “led the
’®®U.S. Senate Reports Committee on Foreign Relations, 24. Also listed as a resource 
for Justice Sutherland's opinion in United States v.Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation. To help 
sustain the charge that the president is the “sole organ” in foreign affairs.
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judiciary to defer to executive judgment in cases involving executive agreements, 
travel abroad, treaty termination, and the war power.”’®® Thus, the judiciary 
extended much leverage and latitude to the executive.
Colegrove v. Green (1946) and Baker v. Carr (1962) were also significant. 
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion for the Court in Colegrove, 
stating that the “courts ought not enter this political thicket.”®®® “The Constitution 
has many commands that are not enforceable by courts because they clearly fall 
outside the conditions and purposes that circumscribe judicial action.”
Frankfurter concluded his opinion by writing that “the Constitution has left the 
performance of many duties in our governmental scheme to depend on the 
fidelity of the executive and legislative action and ultimately, on the vigilance of 
the people in exercising their political rights.”®®’ This meant, whether later 
justices would agree or not, that there are some things that fall outside the 
purview of the judicial branch. In Justice William Brennan’s opinion in the 
Tennessee reapportionment case of Baker v. Carr, he also recognized this 
“political question doctrine,” and said that “federal courts consistently refuse to 
exercise their equity of powers in cases posing political issues.”®®® In Brennan’s 
statement on jurisdiction in Baker v. Carr, he said that under Article III, 2,
Adler, “Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs,” 27. 
^°°Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
®°’ ibid.
^°^Bakerv. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Congress has the power “to assign the jurisdiction of the District Courts,“ and it 
has “exercised that power.”®®®
The Baker and Colegrove cases became more important as the executive 
office and cabinet came under fire for the war in Vietnam. In both Mora v. 
McNamara (1967) and Massachusetts v. Laird (1970) the defendants avowed 
that the Vietnam War was “unconstitutional in that it was not initially authorized or 
subsequently ratified by congressional declaration.”®®'* The courts determined 
that these were not judicial issues, but rather political questions that should be 
left to the democratic process.
Reliance on the past has helped the presidents to judge and establish that 
their judgments supersede those of Congress in foreign relations. Jefferson’s 
use offeree in the Mediterranean and Truman’s use of troops in Korea may not 
have been a deliberate act of usurpation of power, but the inference they left for 
future executives was extremely influential. By their actions, if not intentions, 
they increased the power of the commander in chief clause ten-fold. Jefferson 
believed that, based on prior authorization and with Congress in recess, he could 
circumvent the system and deploy the military without express authorization from 
Congress. Truman on the other hand was blunt about the situation. He never 
intended to get congressional approval because he thought he did not need it.
Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 866 (1970).
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David Adler has recognized that “each presidential war constitutes a 
precedent that in turn legalizes the next action.”®®® Even though it was the intent 
of our Founders for Congress to initiate war, time and technology have shifted 
that power away from the legislature and into the hands of the executive. 
International organizations do not have the power to coerce countries to commit 
forces, but United States presidents usually do if they can protect the country’s 
peace and prevent a power struggle with Congress. International organizations 
just provide another avenue for presidents to make commitments beyond their 
constitutional provisions. And, the U.S. courts have reinforced and ratified the 
President’s actions.
^°^David Gray Adler, “The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking,” in The Constitution 
and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy ed. David Gray Adler and Larry N. George (Kansas: 
University of Kansas Press, 1996), 183.
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CHAPTER VI 
FAILING GRADE
Several legislators commented that they regretted voting in favor of the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution, but that recognition came slowly. J. William Fulbright’s (D- 
Ark.) own acknowledgement of his acquiescence came earlier than most, but for 
all of his rhetoric Fulbright was more talk than action. He recalled that his role in 
the “adoption of the resolution of August 7, 1964,” was neither a source of 
“pleasure or pride.” “The resolution was adopted during an election campaign, 
but that hardly excuses the Congress for granting such sweeping authority with 
so little deliberation.”®®® Fulbright and other members of Congress eventually felt 
betrayed by the Johnson administration. “Several legislators have claimed they 
were duped by clever and conspiring presidents into supporting a war they did 
not approve.”®®̂
It took time, but Congress began fulfilling its responsibility. By 1966, the 
Vietnam hearings held in Washington D.C. televised the war to millions of U.S. 
citizens and in 1968 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on 
the Gulf of Tonkin attacks of August 1964. The debates were underminded by
William Fulbright, Arrogance of Power (New York: Random House, 1966), 52.
“̂"George C. Herring, “The Executive, Congress, and the Vietnam War," in Congress and 
United States Foreign Policy: Controlling the Use of Force in the Nuclear Age ed. Michael 
Barnhart (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1987), 176.
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the Johnson administration’s ability to discredit political rivals and use the “rally 
around the flag” phenomenon to support our troops and avoid focus on the 
administration. Despite the administration’s best efforts, Senator Wayne Morse 
(D-Or.) and a few of his colleagues refused to give the President a “blank check” 
in war. They consistently argued for a withdrawal from South Vietnam and to 
curb the presidential war making power. Although withdrawal did not happen 
under the Johnson administration, the struggle to regain congressional authority 
over war grew.
The lack of debate on the August 1964 hearings spilled over into 1965, when 
members of Congress wanted more information on the reasons the United States 
was in Vietnam. On January 3, 1965 Senator Frank Church (D-ID.) “called for a 
full-fledged debate on V i e t n a m . C o n g r e s s  was eager to find a peaceful 
solution to the problem, and the administration reluctantly complied with Church’s 
request. On January 8, Secretary of State Dean Rusk appeared before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss issues concerning our 
involvement in Vietnam. When Senator Fulbright asked Rusk if the committee 
would be consulted before any decision was made to escalate the conflict. Rusk 
responded that he would bring the Senate’s request to the President’s
^°®Mike Mansfield to Lyndon Johnson, December 9, 1964, National Security File, Name 
File, Container 3, LBJ; Lyndon Johnson to Mike Mansfield, December 17, 1964, National Security 
File, Name File, Container 3, LBJ Library.
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attention.^°^ Rusk’s attitude suggested that Congress’s consultation was a 
formality not a prerequisite to engage in hostilities.
With the optimism that the war would soon be over and a peaceful means 
negotiated, Senator Fulbright appeared on Meet the Press on March 14 to 
discuss the escalating events in Vietnam. Even though the Marines had landed 
at Danang a week earlier, Fulbright expressed only mild “concern over the crisis,” 
and doubted that the “present conditions were not so critical in Vietnam that a 
public debate either by my committee (Senate Foreign Relations Committee) or 
the Congress would serve any good purpose.”^ °̂ According to historian Stanley 
Karnow, “the marine deployment was one of those crucial decisions of the war, 
but it hardly stirred a ripple, either in Congress or the American press.
Fulbright did not mention the deployment in his interview, emphasizing Karnow’s 
assertion that the deployment was not important. Fulbright did begin to have 
private misgivings about the war, but he refrained from airing his differences with 
the administration publicly.
In the early phases of the war. President Johnson enjoyed high approval 
ratings. In January and February 1965, “the polls showed that people rallied 
behind the President as commander in chief when he acted decisively.”^̂  ̂ At this 
point in time, the public and legislative bodies believed Johnson had acted
“̂^Declassified Hearings on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 8 January 
1965, 167-68. Courtesy of the Virtual Vietnam Project at Texas A&M University.
^̂ “William C. Berman, William Fulbright and the Vietnam War: The Dissent of a Political 
Realist (Kent, Ohio; The Kent State University Press, 1988), 35.
Karnow, Vietnam: A Historv. 416.
^'^Ibid., 410-11.
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decisively. According to historian Fredrik Logevall, “lawmakers and constituents 
would follow the administrations lead on the war, whichever way it chose to
Fulbright had another opportunity to debate Vietnam policy on April 30. 
Secretary Rusk appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee again, 
but this time to discuss the deployment of troops to the Dominican Republic. The 
talk quickly turned to Vietnam. Fulbright inquired about the administration’s 
future plans. The committee wanted reassurance that Congress would be 
informed about the administration’s intentions regarding Vietnam, but Fulbright 
also wanted to reassure Rusk that they “were not willing to confront the President 
publicly.” Fulbright added that, “a lot of us have been quiet. We do not want to 
embarrass the administration and so we have not discussed it in public. I think it 
would be wise to present this matter in front of Congress to tell us how much and 
how far they are contemplating going.
Still, the Senate and Fulbright were hesitant to refuse funding. On June 1, 
1965, Fulbright helped to promote and pass an $89 million appropriations bill for 
social and economic reconstruction of South Vietnam, because as the senator 
declared, “support for this program was essential because the stakes were so 
high.”^̂  ̂ Fulbright later lamented his decision, but he deemed it necessary to
^’ \ogevall, Choosing War. 377.
^’ '‘Declassified Hearings on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 30 April 1965, 
17. Courtesy of the Virtual Vietnam Project at Texas A&M University
^’ ^Berman, William Fulbright and the Vietnam War, 40.
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support our administration even though the United State’s prospects for peace 
were going by the way-side.
It took almost a full year after the passage of the Tonkin Resolution before 
Fulbright recognized that the administration had betrayed him. He assumed the 
escalation of troops and U.S. involvement would be used for a last resort, after all 
negotiations were exhausted. “On July 28,1965, Johnson announced at mid­
day, when television audiences were the smallest, that I have asked the 
commanding general. General William C. Westmoreland, what more he needs to 
meet this mounting aggression. He has told me and we will meet his needs. We 
cannot be defeated by force of arms. We will stand firm in V i e t n a m . F u l b r i g h t  
felt betrayed, and according to Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT) Johnson “took the 
nation to war in July 1965 with only a few scattered whimpers of dissent.”^̂ ^
Senator Fulbright defended his right to disagree with the administration in a 
speech on the Senate floor on September 15. “I think we Americans tend to put 
to high a value on unanimity-as if there were something dangerous and 
illegitimate about honest differences of opinions honestly expressed by honest 
men. It was my obligation as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that I offer my advice in foreign matters, since the political opposition, 
whose function it is to criticize, was simply not doing it.”^̂  ̂ The political fallout
^’®Karnow, Vietnam: A Historv. 426.
^’ '^Mike Mansfield to Johnson, 27 July 1965, Lyndon B. Johnson Papers, National 
Security File, National Security Council Histories: Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, 
July 1965, Box 40, Vietnam Virtual Archive @ Texas A&M University.
’̂^Congressional Record. I l l  (22 October 1965): 27465.
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was harsh. Johnson was the type of man who took criticism personally, and 
Fulbright’s public display of dissent tore the two colleagues apart. Fulbright later 
lamented that he wished the two could reconcile their differences, but the 
administration labeled the chairman “persona non grata”. The separation was 
complete. Fulbright’s public outing solidified his public opposition to Johnson’s 
Vietnam policies.
After his public break with the administration, Fulbright continued 
investigations into Vietnam. In early March 1966, the senator received a 
correspondence from retired Admiral Arnold True. In the letter the admiral wrote 
that the “administration’s explanation of the events of August 4, 1964 sounds 
unrealistic.”^̂ ® The letter prompted Chairman Fulbright to hold a closed-door 
hearing on the Tonkin incidents in May 1966 before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. Assistant Secretary of Defense, John T. McNaughton testified 
before the committee about the events of August 1964. McNaughton’s testimony 
gave Fulbright the ability to see the growing gap between the administration’s 
claim and the actual events that transpired in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964. 
Nevertheless, Fulbright concluded that without far more evidence, the committee 
could never prove that the administration had deceived the Senate about those 
events even though he had long since known that the incident of August 4 
probably never took place.^^° The suspicion of the inaccuracy of the
’̂ “Congressional Record, 114 (27 March 1968); 7387. 
™Berman, William Fulbright and the Vietnam War. 69-70.
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administration’s version of the attacks of August 4 persisted long after this 
hearing and beyond the 1968 hearings on the Tonkin incidents.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held another hearing on September 
20,1966 to further probe the August 1964 events. The chairman asked the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William P. Bundy, if he were 
part of the administration at the time of the August 1964 events, and if any 
contingent drafts of the resolution existed before August. Bundy responded that 
the administration in fact did have drafts, but that they were merely a part of 
contingency planning. The administration anticipated the possibility that the 
situation might take a drastic turn and believed it would be wise to seek an 
affirmation of the desires and intent of Congress.^^^
Fulbright not only used hearings to air his differences about the war, but he 
took to the college campus as well. He delivered a profound series of lectures on 
April 21, 27 and May 5 for Johns Hopkins University’s Christian A. Herter Lecture 
Series. The three lectures discussed the ascension of the presidency by 
congressional acquiescence. In his first lecture, Fulbright examined how 
Congress had lost power to the President in making foreign policy because of 
crisis. He stated that, “the President was better equipped to handle emergencies 
than Congress,” and the “problem was to find a way to restore the constitutional 
balance, so the Senate can discharge its duty of advice and consent in an era of
“̂ ’ statement by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
10 September 1966, LBJ Library.
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permanent c r i s i s . I n  his final speech on May 5, Fulbright openly opposed the 
idea of the imperial presidency and defined the “arrogance of power as a 
psychological need that nations need to prove how much better and bigger they 
are ”223 Qespite his outward appearances, he had not broken with those broader 
policies which helped to make the Vietnam intervention possible, and he still 
favored using U.S. political pressure as a stabilizing force in the world.^ '̂*
Fulbright’s lecture series drew sharp criticism. On the day of his last lecture, 
former-senator from Arizona and 1964 presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, 
scolded Fulbright. He insisted that Fulbright resign as Chair of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee because “he was giving aid and comfort to the 
enemy.”^̂  ̂ Goldwater was not the only individual to take a shot at Fulbright. 
During a Chicago dinner fund-raiser, Johnson blasted back at Fulbright’s 
comments. He said, “I do not think that these men who are out there fighting for 
us tonight, think that we should enjoy the luxury of fighting each other back 
home. There will be nervous nellies and some will become frustrated and 
bothered and break ranks under the strain and turn on their leaders, their 
country, and their own fighting men.”®̂® By labeling Fulbright a coward who
^̂ “Congressional Record. 112 (25 April 1966): 8869-74.
“““Berman, William Fulbright and the Vietnam War. 66.
““'‘ ibid., 66.
“““ ibid., 67.
“““Lee Riley Powell, J. William Fulbright and America’s Lost Crusade: Fulbright, the Cold 
War and the Vietnam War (Little Rock, Arkansas: Rose Publishing Company, 1984), 190-91.
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should not fight with his commander in chief when U.S. boys were in harm’s way, 
Johnson left with little doubt what he thought about congressional dissent.
Fulbright continued to hammer away at the administration’s policies on 
Vietnam, and on July 19, 1967, he delivered a statement before the Sub- 
Committee on Separation of Powers of the Judiciary Committee titled “Congress 
and Foreign Policy.” In his statement, Fulbright acknowledged that the authority 
of Congress in foreign policy had been steadily eroding since 1940, because two 
new devices were invented to replace congressional participation in foreign 
affairs: the joint resolution and congressional briefings. They were designed to 
win consent without advice. Congress has lost the power to declare war as it 
was written into the Constitution, but it has not been “so much usurped as given 
away.”^̂  ̂ Fulbright’s view on the accession of the power of the President was 
still doing little to convert his colleagues, but he was getting his message out. 
Despite the rhetoric, Fulbright failed to help Congress reassert its power over 
foreign affairs under Johnson. Almost every time a major vote was to take place 
to repeal the Tonkin resolution or cut funding, Fulbright feared a failure to 
succeed would be a reaffirmation of the President’s policies. He did not want to 
vote on another amendment to repeal the Tonkin Resolution for fear it would not 
get enough votes. As historian Stanley Karnow stated, “for all their qualms about 
war, members of Congress were long on rhetoric and short on action.
““ '’statement of Senator J.W. Fulbrigfit before the Subcommittee on Separation of 
Powers of the Judiciary Committee, “Congress and Foreign Policy,” (19 July 1967), 5, 11. 
Courtesy of the Virtual Vietnam Project at Texas A&M University.
“““karnow, Vietnam: A Historv, 491.
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If Fulbright was unwilling to assert legislation curbing presidential power, 
Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR) was not. Morse was one of two individuals in both 
Houses who voted against the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and the testimony 
during August 6 and 7, 1964 had not changed his opinion of the 
unconstitutionality of the resolution. Senator Morse was an outspoken critic of 
the war who did more than talk. At the end of February 1966, Morse initiated a 
repeal of the Tonkin Resolution because of his dissatisfaction with the Vietnam 
Hearings. It garnered the support of only four other senators, and it was 
eventually shelved on March 1, because as Senate Majority Leader Mike 
Mansfield (D-Mt) stated “the country was at war,” and “we are in too deep 
now.”^̂ ® The Senate rejected the amendment by a resounding 92 to 5. Fulbright 
opposed any additional attempts to obtain repeal until the dissenters could 
expect to gain substantially more than 5 votes. In 1966 such attempts had no 
chance of winning a majority and the administration publicized results such as 
the March 1 vote as an endorsement of escalation.^®®
Morse’s attitude about the wrong direction of the war persisted well into 1967 
and 1968. While debating House Bill 10738 (Defense Appropriations Bill for 
fiscal year 1968), he stated “that the appropriations for the entire government in 
1951 was $34 billion”...and “here we have a bill for $70.2 billion for defense 
alone. Congress cannot possibly justify a defense budget of this magnitude.” He 
concluded his remarks that “this is not a government by law, it is a government
““®lbid., 491.
“““Powell, J. William Fulbright and America’s Lost Crusade. 191.
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by executive decree and that means government by man. Not to mention that 
we have an administration that tells us that if the Tonkin Gulf Resolution were 
rescinded, the President could continue to do what he wanted in Vietnam and 
elsewhere in the field of foreign policy. I shall vote against the bill.” ®̂̂ The 
senator was fervently opposed to any measure escalating the Vietnam War, and 
he tried to make it clear that no matter what Congress did, the administration 
would continue the war.
Senator Wayne Morse was a maverick by Congress’s standards. He never 
followed the rank and file of the party system, but he was a man who fought with 
passion. Former colleague Senator William Proxmire (D-Wi) remembered Morse 
as a man who “always argued his position with great force and most senators 
deeply respected the sincerity of his convictions.” ®̂̂ Morse incessantly defended 
his decisions not to authorize war in Southeast Asia because it was a violation of 
the Constitution and international law. Six months before his death in 1974, 
Morse commented on the constitutionality of legislative acts. He said “that many 
people seemed to think that because the Senate passed something, that made it 
constitutional. But, the Senate cannot make something constitutional that is 
unconstitutional. The authority they sought to give the President in the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution was an unconstitutional act on the part of Congress as well as 
on the part of the President.” According to historian Mason Drukman,
““ ’Congressional Record. 113 (22 August 1967): 23463-65.
“““Mason Drukman, Wavne Morse: A Political Bioaraphv (Portland, Oregon: The Oregon 
Historical Society Press, 1997), 6-7.
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“congressional irresponsibility was revealed nowhere more than in the 1964 
debate over the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.” ®̂®
Because of his outspoken rhetoric on the war, Morse was defeated in his 
reelection bid for the Senate in November 1968. He lost to Robert Packwood, 
who charged that “Morse’s opposition to continued funding of military action in 
Vietnam was reckless, because such restrictions would cut off military support for 
soldiers.” ®̂'* Morse lost because he was too candid about his opposition to the 
war, and because Packwood used the “support our troops” cry to portray Morse 
as an outsider who put U.S. soldiers in harm’s way.
Morse and the other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
were able to use their time effectively. According to historian David F. Schmitz, 
“Frank Church sought a broader forum for discussion of the war,” and “in late 
July 1965, he urged the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hold public 
hearings.” ®̂® Church’s urgings prompted the Senate committee to begin 
hearings in January 1966 on Vietnam. During January and February, Fulbright’s 
committee “used the well publicized televised hearings to place the Vietnam 
policy on trial.” ®̂® These were the first public airings of differences between the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the White House. On January 28 the
“““ ibid., 408.
““'‘Wayne Morse Center for Law and Politics, 3. 
morsechair.uoregon.edu/moreaboutwayne.php History of Wayne Morse’s political career.
“““David F. Schmitz, “Congress Must Draw the Line: Senator Frank Church and the 
Opposition to the Vietnam War and the Imperial Presidency,’’ in Vietnam and the American 
Political Tradition ed. Randall B. Woods (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 130.
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Senate committee began heanng testimony from Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
In his prepared statement, Rusk reiterated that the “Integrity of our commitments 
is absolutely essential to the preservation of peace around the globe.” Rusk 
repeated as President Johnson had said In his State of the Union Address last 
week, “the door of peace must be kept wide open for all who wish to avoid the 
scourge of war, but the door of aggression must be closed and bolted if man 
himself Is to survive.
Rusk was bombarded with questions at the close of his statement. Fulbright 
asked Rusk to explain the origin and basis for U.S. commitment in Vietnam. The 
secretary responded that we were entitled to offer assistance because Vietnam 
was listed as a protocol state under the SEATO Treaty. Fulbright commented 
later in the hearing that the obligation was to consult with our allies. “We have no 
unilateral obligation to do what we are d o i n g . F u l b r i g h t  also queried the 
secretary about the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. He asked Rusk if he thought the 
resolution followed the constitutional process. Rusk replied yes, because the 
“resolution was signed by Congress, the President, and it could be repealed by a 
concurring resolution which would not need the signature of the President.” ®̂®
Senator Morse declined his opportunity to question Rusk. He merely wanted 
to state for the record that he disagreed with practically every major premise 
contained in Rusk’s prepared statement and preceding comments. “I completely
““ '^United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Reiations, The Vietnam 
Hearings into by J. Wiliiam Fulbright (New York: Random House, 1966), 4, 5.
“““ ibid., 36.
““®lbid., 44.
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disagree with the interpretation of the SETO Treaty, and I do not think the treaty 
justifies in any way the unilateral American action in South V i e t n a m . M o r s e ’s 
fiery temper illustrated his complete distrust of the executive to bring the war to a 
peaceful conclusion.
Questions and comments from the committee were not limited to Morse and 
Fulbright. Senator Albert Gore (D-TN) noted that he voted for the resolution in 
response to this specific attack. He disassociated himself from any interpretation 
that he voted for a declaration of war. Rusk responded to the senator’s 
comments by stating that “it seems quite clear that the way this matter was 
discussed at the time (August 1964), it was not related solely to the attack on a 
ship in the Gulf of Tonkin.^"*  ̂ Rusk understood that the resolution was in fact a 
de facto declaration of war. Senator Clairborne Pell (D-Rhode Island) proclaimed 
“each year we do what the military asks us and we give them what they want.”
He “did not think any of their requests for money or materiel have been turned 
down but the country seems no nearer the end of the road now then we were 
then.” '̂*̂  The senators were beginning to understand that Vietnam was a 
quagmire, and advances had not been made despite considerable funding.
Questions arose outside the Senate as well. During a CBS Prime-Time 
special on February 1, Senator Fulbright talked about the situation in Southeast 
Asia. He apologized for his role in pushing the Tonkin Gulf Resolution through
“'‘“ ibid., 13-14.
“'"ibid., 44-45, 50. 
“'‘“ ibid., 25-26.
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the Senate. He said, “I should have had greater foresight in the consideration of 
that resolution. I think we are in a terrible situation and I am hoping we can find 
an honorable way out of it.” '̂̂ ® During his interview, Fulbright did not mention 
repealing the Tonkin Resolution which could have emphatically reversed the 
administration’s position on the war or at least reasserted some congressional 
authority.
The committee hearings resumed on February 10, when former United States 
Ambassador George Kennan appeared before the committee. Kennan stated in 
his prepared testimony that “if we were not already involved in Vietnam as we are 
today, I would know of no reason why we should wish to become so involved. 
Vietnam is not a region of major military or industrial importance. We should 
liquidate our involvement in Vietnam just as soon as possible without 
jeopardizing our prestige or stability of South V i e t n a m . H i s  statement 
reinforced the fears many members had. Senator George Aiken (R-VT) 
acknowledged that to “commit ourselves without limitations is certainly a pretty 
heavy responsibility for anyone to a s s u m e . A s  would become clear, many of 
the senators believed that they had not made an unlimited commitment to 
hostilities in Vietnam; yet given the wording of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that 
intention was difficult to refute. Senator Frank Church, similar to Senator
“'’“Congressional Record, 112 (2 February 1966): 1941-43.
“‘’‘’United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Vietnam
Hearings, 108-09.
“'’“ ibid., 149.
82
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Fulbright, “regretted” his vote in favor of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution “to the end 
if his life.”®̂®
Former Ambassador to South Vietnam and the current Special Assistant to 
the President, General Maxwell D. Taylor appeared before the committee on 
February 17. His testimony irritated Senator Morse. Their exchange of words in 
the hearing personified the debate that began to stir the country. Morse said to 
Taylor that “you know we are engaged in historic debate in this country, where 
there are honest differences of opinion. I happen to hold to the point of view that 
it is not going to be long before the American people as a people will repudiate 
our war in Southeast Asia.” Taylor quickly responded “that, of course, is good 
news to Hanoi, Senator.” '̂*̂  That poignant remark personified the 
administration’s position that public dissent hurt the soldiers in combat. When 
asked by the committee what the limits on U.S. forces were in Vietnam, General 
Taylor replied that the North Vietnamese were the ones to decide what that limit 
was through the extent of their aggression. General Taylor’s remarks suggested 
the administration was in South Vietnam for the long haul.
The impact of the hearings was tremendous. The Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee examined the potential threat of China and the Soviet Union, and they 
better understood that the country’s commitments in Vietnam threatened 
disastrous consequences if left unchecked. Frank Church called the hearings 
profound. “Once it became apparent to the American people that there were
“'’“F. Forrester Church, Father and Son: A Personal Biography of Senator Frank Church
of Idaho by His Son (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), 59.
“'*'^The Vietnam Hearings, 187.
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members of this committee, who were loyal Americans who disagreed with the 
war, then the general resistance to the war and the debate itself over the war 
began to spread. But if we had not gone out from behind closed doors, this 
never would have happened.” '̂̂ ®
Millions viewed the hearings. Some 30 million viewers watched the hearings, 
but a survey by the Louis Harris Poll indicated that only 37 percent of the public 
heard about the hearings, and most of those were college educated individuals. 
Fifty-five percent of those polled believed the hearings were helpful, whereas 45 
percent thought otherwise. A damaging 60 percent felt that Senator Wayne 
Morse had been more harmful than helpful to the proceedings with his outspoken 
criticism. '̂*® Only 37 percent of Americans heard of the hearings was in part 
because, Johnson hastily initiated a conference in Honolulu in early February to 
divert public attention. The administration’s hope was to avoid bad news that 
might come out of the televised hearings. While in Honolulu, Johnson meet with 
the leaders of the South Vietnamese government Nguyen Cao Ky and General 
Nguyen VanThieu and promised them that America will hold firm in its 
commitments to South Vietnam.
During Johnson’s administration, the majority of doves in Congress were 
Democrats. It was difficult for many congressmen to refuse support to their 
party’s leader, and Johnson’s personality made it even more difficult. He did not 
permit criticism and his commanding demeanor demanded obedience.
“'’“David F. Schmitz, “Congress Must Draw the Line; Senator Frank Church and the 
Opposition to the Vietnam War and the Imperial Presidency,” 132.
“'’“Berman, William Fulbright and the Vietnam War. 60-61.
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Moreover, during the early phases of the war, Johnson’s approval ratings were 
high. The May 7, 1965, issue of Time Magazine praised Johnson for “acting 
swiftly and with strength of purpose.”^̂ ® But the “problem Frank Church (D-ID)” 
and other Democrats “faced throughout 1964-65 was how to criticize American 
policy while still backing the new president, Lyndon Johnson, whose domestic 
programs he fully supported.”®®̂
Nonetheless, Johnson’s leadership was repeatedly questioned. Just before 
the start of the Vietnam Hearings, Senator’s Mike Mansfield (D-MT) and George 
Aiken (R-VT) prepared a report in January 1966 concerning the prospects of the 
Vietnam crisis after they toured Southeast Asia. The report suggested that the 
“conflict in Vietnam was teetering on the brink of disaster, and it was quickly 
becoming open-ended and it had the potential to spill over into China.” ®̂̂
Despite growing concern over Vietnam, Johnson reiterated his strong stance in 
his State of the Union Address on January 12. Johnson declared that “days may 
become months and months may become years, but we will stay as long as 
aggression commands us to battle.” ®̂®
Later that same month, Senator Vance Hartke (D-IN) sent a letter to the 
President, calling for him to halt the bombing and for the United States to pursue 
aggressive negotiations. Hartke delivered the message to the President with the
“““Kathleen J. Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1985), 135.
““ ’ David F. Schmitz, “Congress Must Draw the Line: Senator Frank Church and the 
Opposition to the Vietnam War and the imperial Presidency,” 125.
“““Congressional Record. 112 (24 January 1966): 908.
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support and signatures of 14 other senators. Johnson was less than thrilled by 
this outburst of congressional opinion, and he publicly labeled Hartke as 
“obstreperous” and privately as a “prick.” In retaliation for his remarks, Johnson 
dismissed the senator’s protégés from their federal positions.^®'' Publicly berating 
congressmen was an effective mechanism the White House used to keep order.
If members of Congress praised the administration they were rewarded with 
special favors, but critics were called to the White House for a special dose of the 
infamous Johnson treatment where a member might find himself “ostracized” and 
“publicly discredited” as unpatriotic.^®®
Senator Hartke was not the only individual to press for peace negotiations. 
Senator Church publicly urged the President to negotiate with North Vietnam, 
and that infuriated Johnson. During a crowded White House dinner in May 1966, 
Johnson replied to Church’s communication and asked him who he consulted in 
preparation of his speech. Church replied that he conferred with Walter Lippman 
(newspaper columnist for the New York Times). Johnson snapped and said, 
“alright Frank, next time you want a dam for Idaho, go talk to Walter Lippman.” 
After being publicly degraded. Church fell into line with nearly the entire Senate 
to grant Johnson’s request for $700 million in appropriations to conduct the war. 
Johnson had not needed the funds, but he wanted a reaffirmation of 
congressional assent for his Vietnam policy. Johnson was even able to get 
former President Eisenhower to issue a statement declaring “none of us should
““'’Karnow, Vietnam: A History. 485.
“““Herring, “Ttie Executive, Congress, and ttie Vietnam War,” 178.
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try to divide the support that citizens owe their head of state in critical 
international situations.” ®̂®
As the war escalated so did the financial burden, and most of the senators 
who ideologically opposed the war, like Senator’s Fulbright and Mansfield, were 
persuaded that “our boys had to have whatever they needed on the front, 
whether we wanted them there or not.” ®̂̂ The United States sent billions in 
securing its defenses in Vietnam, and in “1967 the war cost the United States 
$10 for every $1 worth of damage inflicted.” ®̂® From March 1965 to November 
1968, Operation “Rolling Thunder” dropped over a million tons of bombs, rockets 
and missiles and the United States imposed about $300 million in damage on 
North Vietnam, but at a lose to the American air force of 700 aircraft valued at 
$900 million.̂ ®® The “rally around the flag” phenomenon effectively served the 
White House through the summer of 1973 when Richard Nixon was President. 
Presidential administration’s used this tactic brilliantly to counter dissenters. 
Senator Richard Russell (D-GA) echoed these sentiments in a letter to a 
constituent on August 14, 1965. Russell replied to his constituent that “we are 
there now, and the time for debate has passed. Our flag is committed and 
American boys are under fire.” ®̂°
“““Karnow, Vietnam: A Historv. 421.
““ '’Drukman, Wavne Morse: A Political Bioaraphiv, 425-26.
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The escalation of forces and funding rose sharply after the United States 
committed troops to South Vietnam in March 1965. At end of year 1966 there 
was 386,300 military personnel in South Vietnam, and that number increased by
100,000 by December 31, 1967. Military personnel would max out at 543,400 in 
April 1969, and by 1967, 6,000 U.S. soldiers had been killed in Vietnam.^®^ The 
military budget for Vietnam in fiscal year 1967 was estimated to cost between 
$11-17 billion, but it consumed $21 billion.®®̂  It averaged out to $1.75 billion a 
month, $403,850 million a week, and $57.5 million a day. The conflict in Vietnam 
“demonstrated to the world that even with an army of half a million men and 
expenditures of $21 billion per year, America could not win a crucial war for a 
regime which was incapable of inspiring the patriotism of its own people.^®®
The executive’s request for money and personnel went unobstructed, and the 
insignificant dove call was drowned out by the hawks. By October 1966 only 15 
percent of the congressional membership favored greater stress on initiating 
peace talks, and as author William C. Berman stated “after the November 
election Congress was even more hawkishly inclined than the previous one.”®®'* 
During the early stages of the war, the doves were drastically outnumbered. It
““ ’ Herring, America’s Longest War. 182. Table showing the increase of military strength 
in South Vietnam from December 31, 1960 through June 30, 1973. It was broken down yearly 
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would not be until late 1969 when the doves gained a commanding lead over the 
hawkish Senate 55-31 ®®® Even so, their influence was only beginning to be felt.
The President placated Congress by recalling General William Westmoreland 
back from Vietnam to “revive the country’s flagging spirit” in November 1967.
The administration had Westmoreland trek across the country to give optimistic 
portrayals of the war to the public. He was purposely steered away from dovish 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee because the administration feared that the 
committee might stir up controversial issues. Instead, General Westmoreland 
met with “tamer” members of Congress and gave a rosy picture of the situation in 
Southeast Asia.®®® The decision to keep him away from the Fulbright committee 
was an indicator that the situation in South Vietnam was not as secure as the 
administration claimed, and keeping it out of the public eye was necessary to 
stay the course.
Despite the public’s growing opposition to Vietnam, it was quite clear that 
congressional power to control war slipped. Historian Henry Steele Commager 
discussed the issue in an article about whether the Senate could limit presidential 
power. In his examination of senatorial control over presidential power, he 
quoted Under-Secretary Nicholus deB Katzenbach having said “that declarations 
of war are outmoded;” thus neatly repealing a clause in the Constitution without 
the bother of congressional and state action. He concluded his remarks that the
Dale Walton, The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam (Portland, Oregon: 
Frank Cass, 2002), 35.
“““Karnow, Vietnam: A Historv. 513-14.
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“Tonkin Resolution combined with the SEATO Treaty constituted a functional 
equivalent to a declaration of war.”®®̂
Even though the dovish members of Congress were unable to repeal the 
Tonkin Resolution or reduce funding, they did investigate extensively the 
circumstances surrounding the official U.S. commitment to Vietnam. During a 
presidential breakfast with congressional leaders in January 1968, Senator Frank 
Lausche (R-OH) warned the President that Secretary McNamara would be called 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to demonstrate that he mislead 
the nation into improper use of military forces in the Tonkin Bay.®®® On February 
20,1968, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara appeared before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. In a letter sent by Senator Fulbright, he assured 
the secretary that “the interest of the committee is in your testimony of August 6, 
1964, and of discussing what lessons have been learned about the problems of 
analyzing information in the midst of a crisis.”®®®
In his prepared statement, McNamara reasserted his claim that both attacks 
did occur: “We had intelligence reports of a highly classified and unimpeachable 
nature that the attacks took place on both August 2 and 4.”®̂ ° He argued that it 
was possible that the confusion surrounding the August 4 attack was mistaken or 
replaced with the events of September 18, 1964. The U.S.S. Morton and
“““Congressional Record-Senate. 115 (22 April 1968): S4349.
“““Barrett ed., Lyndon B. Jotinson's Vietnam Papers. 579-80.
““^Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's Testimony before the Senate Foreign 
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Edwards patrolled the Gulf of Tonkin on September 18, at night, and they initially 
reported that they were under attack, but both “Washington and the field 
command levels” insisted there was “no credible evidence an attack existed.”®̂* 
McNamara persisted that the administration possessed incontrovertible evidence 
that the attack on August 4, 1964,occurred. The secretary declared that in July 
1967 the United States captured a North Vietnamese naval officer who provided 
the name of the commander of the PT squadron in the Gulf on August 4. The 
“intelligence reports received immediately after the August 4 attack, included the 
commander and squadron by name and number as participants.” There was “no 
uncertainty about the fact that an attack took place on August 4.”®̂®
McNamara also addressed the issue that the U.S. naval forces provoked an 
attack. He insisted that the Turner Jov and Maddox “played absolutely no part in 
the South Vietnamese naval activity. The two operations were separate and 
distinct.”®̂® Nevertheless, the secretary disclosed that even though he claimed 
the destroyers had no knowledge of the South Vietnamese activities, the “U.S. 
destroyers were directed to remain in waters which would keep them from 
becoming operationally involved with the South Vietnamese activity.”®̂"* In 
addition, McNamara reaffirmed that the U.S. vessels were in international waters. 
The United States recognized only a 3 mile territorial coastal limit, and Hanoi 
never officially changed it; so the United States adhered to the 3 mile limit
““ ’ ibid., 17.
“““ ibid., 15, 18. 
“““ ibid., 9, 14.
““"ibid., 14.
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established under the French government. Hanoi had not claimed 12 mile 
territorial limit until September 1, 1964 when it was broadcast on Radio Hanoi.®̂ ® 
Senator Morse, the administration’s leading critic, accused the administration 
and McNamara of misleading the Senate in August 1964 with fragmented 
information. Morse read a message that was sent out on July 15, 1964,by a 
naval commander of the Pacific Fleet. The message spoke of increased 
activities of 0PLAN-34A.®^® Morse believed that the United States was not only 
“involved in an electronic spying mission,” but also “provoked the North 
Vietnamese" to the brink of war.®^^
During a presidential luncheon on February 20, McNamara discussed his 
testimony with the President and other cabinet members. The President 
commented that he supposed McNamara had a “better case on the fact the 
attack occurred than on the charge that we did provoke the attack.” The 
secretary responded by saying “I have a good case that there was an attack. 
They think we responded too soon.”®̂®
After these new rounds of hearings on the Tonkin incidents in January 1968, 
Johnson was unable to control dissent or gain congressional favor for his 
Vietnam policies. In a report about additional troop escalation in Vietnam,
“““ ibid., 12-13.
“““Congressional Record. 114 (21 February 1968): 3814.
“““Congressional Record. 114 (28 February 1968): 4578-79. Senator Wayne Morse gave 
a statement on our aggression in the Gulf of Tonkin and how the administration failed to give the 
Senate this information before they deliberated on the resolution.
“““Barrett ed., Lvndon B. Johnson’s Vietnam Papers, 620. President’s luncheon meeting 
on February 20, 1968, with foreign policy advisers.
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Senator Mansfield responded to ttie President’s request that “any increase above 
the 525,000 assigned level ought to be resisted.” Mansfield insisted the United 
States “ought to conserve its sources.”®̂® On March 4, the President met with his 
senior foreign policy advisors to discuss Vietnam policies. Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk told the President that “we could go to Congress for specific actions,” 
but “we do not want a general declaration.” The President responded that “we 
face a real problem” in the Senate. “Anything that required any authority may 
result in a filibuster.”®®® The administration knew it was losing control over the 
war, but they still enjoyed a joint resolution that granted the White House the 
power to wage war.
“““ ibid., 668. Letter to Lyndon Johnson from Senator Mansfield concerning requests for 
additional troops in Vietnam.
“““ ibid., 650.
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CHAPTER VII
SMALL GAINS, HUGES LOSSES 
The nation elected Richard M. Nixon in November 1968 with the hope that his 
plan for peace would prevail and the United States could escape Vietnam. 
Congressional resurgence grew but did not come to fruition until the beginning of 
Nixon’s second administration, and shortly before his resignation over the 
Watergate scandal. Congress had grown weary of the war by 1968. In addition, 
after 1968 congressional Democrats no longer felt torn between loyalty to a 
president of their own political party and the growing antiwar sentiment.^®^ 
Nevertheless, Congress’s small gains in reasserting power were lost in the 
passage of the War Powers Resolution of 1973.
Congress was willing to give President Nixon an opportunity to end the 
Vietnam War. Nixon enjoyed a year-long honeymoon on Vietnam, but that did 
not stop Congress from indirectly investigating the White House’s Vietnam policy 
through Stuart Symington’s (D-MO) subcommittee of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. The subcommittee focused on U.S. military assistance to 
Laos in the spring and summer of 1969.^®  ̂ Symington was appointed by William
Robert D. Schluzinger, “Richard Nixon, Congress, and the War in Vietnam, 1969- 
1974,” in Vietnam and the American Political Tradition ed. Randall B. Woods (New York; 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 284.
^^Ibid., 282, 284.
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Fulbright on February 3, 1969, to head the ad hoc Subcommittee on Security 
Agreements and Commitments Abr oad. Fu l b r i gh t  railed against the current 
administration for conducting a “secret war.” “The Symington subcommittee 
believed that both President’s Johnson and Nixon were maneuvering to secure 
congressional acquiescence in the early stages of another open-ended 
commitment similar to the growing involvement in Vietnam in the early 1960s.” ®̂'* 
Nixon thought the only way to deal with Symington’s committee was to give it as 
little attention as possible and hope Laos would fade from the public eye. 
According to historian Linda McFarland, “not only did the Nixon administration 
refuse to cooperate in providing information, it also forbade administration 
witnesses to appear before the subcommittee, because Southeast Asia was a 
particularly sensitive area.” ®̂̂
Despite Nixon’s confidence that there was a large “silent majority” who 
supported his policies, Congress was no longer willing to let the president go 
unchecked. On December 18, 1969, Senator John Sherman Cooper (R/KY) and 
Senator Frank Church (D-ID) successfully attached the Copper-Church 
amendment to a Department of Defense Procurement and Development Act.̂ ®® 
This measure limited U.S. activities in Southeast Asia by prohibiting 
appropriations supporting United States combat troops in Laos and Thailand.
^®^McFarland, Cold War Strategist, 145.
284,Schluzinger, “Richard Nixon, Congress, and the War in Vietnam, 1969-1974," 285. 
“̂ McFarland, Cold War Strategist. 146.
^^®David F. Schmitz, “Congress Must Draw the Line: Senator Frank Church and the 
Opposition to the Vietnam War and the Imperial Presidency,” 137.
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Congress would not go further; a large majority felt they could not break with the 
President without jeopardizing the lives of American troops.
In June 1970 Congress attempted to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. On 
June 24, the Senate voted to rescind the resolution by a vote of 81 to 10, and on 
January 12, 1971, the House followed suit and repealed the resolution.^®® The 
Nixon administration appeared unconcerned about the repeal because the 
President and his advisors believed they did not need the resolution to wage war 
in Vietnam. Nixon based his legal justification for being in Vietnam on the “right 
of the President of the United States under the Constitution to protect the lives of 
American men.” ®̂® The administration also claimed that by 1971 a number of 
different appropriations had authorized the war. “Throughout the six year life of 
the resolution. Congress had given its stamp of approval for the war more than 
once.”̂ ®°
The repeal of the resolution was a major advance for congressional power, 
but it did not end the war. By December 1970 the United States still had over
334,000 troops in Vietnam and by the end of 1971, almost a full year after the
Harold Hongju Koh, “Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs,” in 
The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy ed. David Gray Adler and Larry N. 
George (Kansas; University of Kansas Press, 1996), 172-73.
^®®Public Law 91-672 13 January 1971. Repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
^®®William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 162-63.
^®°John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its 
Aftermath (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 32-34.
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repeal, the troop level remained over 156,000 troops.^®  ̂ In practical terms the 
repeal failed to end the military involvement that its creation had begun.
Copper-Church and the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution were not the 
only attempts to reassert congressional power. During the May 1970 session of 
Congress, both the second version of the Cooper-Church amendment and the 
Hatfield-McGovern amendment were scheduled for debate. The second Cooper- 
Church amendment was introduced On May 11, to cover the area not included in 
the first amendment: Cambodia. This measure sought to “prevent the United 
States from getting bogged down in Cambodia” by “restricting the deployment of 
troops” there. The Senate passed it on June 30,1970, but the “House of 
Representatives did not approve the modified version of the amendment until 
December.” ®̂̂ The Hatfield-McGovern amendment proposed to cut off all funds 
for the war after 1970 and to direct the withdrawal of all U.S. troops by June 30, 
1971, unless Congress declared war in the interim. The withdrawal date was 
pushed back to gain support from Republican Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY), but 
the amendment failed to garner enough support and was defeated 55-39.^^®
That did not stop George McGovern from directing his anger at fellow senators. 
Minutes before voting began, McGovern lashed out on the Senate floor. He 
stated that “every senator in this chamber is partly responsible for sending
50,000 young Americans to an early grave. This chamber reeks of blood.”
Herring, America’s Longest War. 182. 
^®^Schmitz, “Congress Must Draw the Line,” 141. 
^®^Mann, A Grand Delusion, 659, 667.
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McGovern continued that “not very many of these blasted and broken boys think 
this is a glorious adventure.” “It does not take any courage at all for a 
congressman, or senator, or president to wrap himself in the flag...if we do 
not end this damnable war, those young men will curse us for our pitiful 
willingness to let the executive carry the burden that the Constitution places on 
us/%*
Congress’s restriction of funds did effect the Nixon administration. On 
October 26, 1972, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger proclaimed that 
peace in Indochina was at hand, and the administration called off the bombing of 
North Vietnam until after the election. But on December 18, the administration 
announced that negotiations had been broken off,̂ ®® and the bombing resumed. 
By the end of 1972, the United States had a mere 24,200 troops left in 
Vietnam,^®® and congressional pressure helped to force President Nixon to halt 
the bombing in early January. Kissinger wrote in 1972, that “sooner or later, one 
of the amendments to cut off funds would pass.”^̂ ^
On January 23, 1973, Nixon pronounced that the United States had 
concluded an agreement to end the war and bring peace with honor.̂ ®® Without 
Congress’s reassertive mindset, Nixon might have carried out the bombing
^̂ "’Congressional Record. 116 (1 September 1970); 30682,
^^^Thomas F. Eagleton, War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle of Congressional 
Surrender (New York: Liveright, 1974), 142-43.
^®®Herring, America’s Longest War, 182.
^®^Mann, A Grand Delusion, 704.
^^^Eagleton, War and Presidential Power, 145.
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campaign for years to come. In March, Nixon resumed bombing Cambodia and 
Laos despite congressional opposition. On May 10, the House voted 219-188 for 
the Addabbo Amendment to cut-off funds to Indochina. It was the first time funds 
were directly cut off for the fight in Vietnam. Then on May 31, the Senate 
prohibited any funding for combat activities in Laos or Cambodia.^^® It was clear 
that for all practical considerations, U.S. military activities in Southeast Asia were 
ending.
The Congress was not through reasserting its influence. Congress was not 
satisfied with ending the conflict, it sought to insure that this kind of war would 
never happen again. At least that was the thinking behind the creation of the 
War Powers Resolution. In July, both the House and the Senate adopted 
versions of the War Powers Resolution that Representative Clem Zablocki (Wl) 
first introduced in 1970. On November 16, 1970, Zablocki introduced H.J. 
Resolution 1355 concerning war powers of the Congress and the President. The 
bill recognized that there were “extraordinary and emergency situations” and that 
“whenever feasible the President should seek appropriate consultation with 
Congress before involving the armed forces.” Zablocki said the bill called for the 
President to inform Congress “under what authority he took action,” and for the 
President to “estimate the scope of activities.”®®® The representative insisted that 
this resolution was crucial because “in time of future crisis, the safety and
^®®lbid., 159.
^ Congressional Record. 116 (16 November 1970); 37398.
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salvation of our nation could well depend on just such harmony and cooperation,” 
and the “President and Congress must work together.”
Representative Gerald Ford (R-MI) responded that the resolution was 
necessary, and “the language is very clear and forthright.” Ford also asserted 
amazingly “that through his time in Congress from Truman to Nixon, he knew of 
no President who had been false or deceptive in the information that came out of 
the White House.” When asked about the Tonkin Gulf incident, Ford responded 
that he “believed that the important and responsible committees in Congress 
knew what President Johnson had in mind at the time the resolution was 
submitted to Congress.” The resolution passed the House by an 
overwhelmingly vote of 289 to 39, but the Senate failed to act on the issue before 
the end of the 91 Congress.®®®
The measure was taken up again in August 1971. This time Representative 
Zablocki eliminated the phrase “whenever feasible” from the new version of the 
war powers resolution, but that did not conclude the debates. Representative 
Mitchell, responded to the new resolution that “we must not delude ourselves into 
thinking that the War Powers Resolution is a meaningful deterrent to require that 
the Chief Executive submit a report to the body after he initiates significant 
military action. Consultation is no more than a token and ineffectual gesture and 
Congress must do something concrete in the area of war-making powers.”®®'*
^°’ lbid„ 37398-399.
^ Ib id ., 37403.
^°^Conaressional Record. 117 (2 August 1971); 28870. 
^ Ib id ., 28878.
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Representative Abzug said the measure “fails to define the power reserved to 
Congress by the Constitution to declare war,” and it “leaves the President just as 
free as he is now.” Abzug and Mitchell both declared that they would vote no on 
the bill, and urged others to oppose this “toothless resolution.”®®® That measure 
again felt short-it passed the house but the Senate passed its own version and a 
“parliamentary snail ensued.”®®®
Major debate on the War Powers Resolution resumed on June 25, 1973. 
Debate lasted for over three hours on the floor of the House, and a variety of 
congressmen voiced their opinions concerning war powers and Congress. Clem 
Zablocki continued to promote his legislation. This new version also contained a 
provision that “directed the President in every possible intent to consult with the 
leadership and appropriate committees.” This measure stated that the President 
was “precluded from committing U.S. troops for more than 120 days without 
specific congressional approval.”®®̂ The 120 days provision also raised 
considerable concern. Representative Dennis (IN) questioned if the 
constitutional right to defend the nation expired in 120 days if Congress failed to 
reaffirm the President’s decisions. Representative Frelinghuysen (NJ) replied 
that “if there is authority in the President to take these actions, the lapse of time 
period could not deprive him of that power."®®®
^Ib id ., 28878.
^"^Congressional Record. 119 (25 June 1973): 21209. 
"°^lbid., 21210.
"""ibid., 21215.
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During 1972 and 1973, Congress was able to reconcile and pass a war 
powers resolution. The House passed their version of the bill on July 18 and the 
Senate passed a version on July 20, 1973. The House-Senate conference 
committee produced a final resolution in October and was ready to send it on to 
the President. The House passed the conference bill on October 12, 283-123 
and the Senate passed it 75-20. It was then sent to the president, and Nixon 
vetoed the measure as expected. The House overrode Nixon’s veto by four 
votes to reach the required two thirds (284-135).
The War Powers Act of 1973 became public law 93-148 on November 7 
without the president’s signature. The language of the bill that came out of 
Congress failed to reverse the increasing power of the executive in foreign 
affairs. The intent for the legislation was noble, but the outcome did not fulfill 
those gallant aspirations. Contained within the bill were several sections that 
declared Congress’s intent. Section 2(a) said that the purpose of the legislation 
was to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution for collective judgment of 
both the Congress and the president.®®® Congress was looking for a judicious 
application of its power as a partner and overseer of the executive.®*® The intent 
was to regain footing lost during the Vietnam conflict and since the emergence of 
the “imperial presidency” in 1940.
"""The War Powers Act of 1973, Public Law 93-148, 7 November 1973.
"’ "Alton Frye and Jack Sullivan, “Congress and Vietnam: The Fruits of Anguish," in The 
Congress and the United States 1789-1989 ed. Joel Silbey (Brooklyn, New York: Carlson 
Publishing, 1991), 331.
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But the resolution actually conveyed congressional power to the President, 
because the executive can wage war for sixty days and that can be extended for 
thirty more if Congress was unable to convene. The President was required to 
report to the Congress within forty-eight hours to apprise them of why he had 
committed U.S. troops, ®** but the key contradiction was that he had to report 
after hostilities had begun. As Timothy Baylan wrote in his article “A War Powers 
Resolution: A Rationale for Congressional Inaction,” “presidents have reshaped 
the communications requirements to report decisions and actions already taken 
and go public on television to solidify popular reaction and support.”®*̂  Nixon 
himself called the H.J. Resolution 542 “unconstitutional and charged that it would 
seriously undermine this nation’s ability to act decisively and convincingly in 
times of international crisis.”®*® Nixon’s State Department agreed that the 
legislation was unconstitutional, but for different reasons. It saw the bill as a 
ninety day open-ended grant of authority,®*'* not a restriction on presidential 
authority.
The objective behind the legislation was good. Section 8 (d) stated that 
nothing in this joint resolution is intended to alter the constitutional authority of 
the Congress or the president.®*® Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-MO) disagreed
"’ ’ The War Powers Act of 1973.
"’ "Timothy S. Baylan and Glenn A. Phelps, “The War Powers Resolution: A Rationale for 
Congressional Inaction,” Parameters (Spring 2001): 109-24.
"’ "Eagleton, War and Presidential Power. 213.
"’ '’ ibid., 216.
"’ "The War Powers Act of 1973.
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with that. He wrote portions of the first war powers legislation before it was 
changed to reflect the current legislation. He called the final bill a “failure.” “It 
does not limit the president’s war power. The bill gives the president unilateral 
authority to commit American troops anywhere in the world, under any conditions 
he decides, for sixty to ninety days. I labored to enact war powers legislation 
because I believed that the intent of the Constitution could be recaptured by 
statute.”®*®
What Eagleton overlooked was that there was already a constitutional 
provision for Congress to reclaim power over war: Article I Section 8 Clause 12 of 
the Constitution (To raise and support armies). No legislation could block that 
function. A country cannot wage war with out appropriating funds. If Eagleton 
believed that the intent could be recaptured by statute, then once the maximum 
ninety days was reached would he and other congressmen pull the funding for 
soldiers who were in harm’s way? Or would there be more of the same and rally 
around the flag? Essentially, the War Powers Act allows for Congress to hide 
and the president to aggrandize.®*^ Who is going to deny funds to a president 
when the U.S. flag has been committed?
The framers knew that the power to commit to war was a huge responsibility, 
and that was why they separated the ability to wage war into two branches of the 
government. Congress declares and supports war while the executive manages 
the war. If the legislature opposed the war, it had the power to stop hostilities by
"’ "Eagleton, War and Presidential Power. 216, 224. 
"’^Ely, War and Responsibility. 34.
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refusing funds. Distrust of the executive caused the Founders to vest the power 
of initiating war exclusively in the Congress.®*® Again, the framers believed that a 
“decision for war should be taken by a broadly representative group after debate 
and deliberation; for that body to shirk its responsibility and transfer the power of 
decision to a single person was to acquiesce in tyranny.”®*® That was what the 
War Powers Resolution did. It, like the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, gave the 
President a future blank check.
Not everybody objected to the resolution. The co-sponsor of the resolution in 
the House, Clem Zablocki, believed the bill permitted Congress to respond in an 
appropriate and timely fashion to its constitutional responsibilities in future crisis 
situations.®®® Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY) also suggested that the major purpose 
of the legislation was to force the presidency to “stop, look, and listen and to take 
prudent council when a military operation is suggested.”®®* Zablocki and Javits 
argued that the legislature had learned a lesson and hoped to prevent learning 
that lesson again by creating language that would prevent the Congress from 
granting another blank check. Senator Frank Church reiterated this message 
when he concluded that the legislation was “unfortunate” but “necessary because
"’ "Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power 
of Congress in History and Law (Chicago: Uniyersity of Illinois Press, 1989), 202.
"’ "ibid., 218.
"""John H. Sulliyan, “The Impact of the War Powers Resolution,” in Congress and United 
States Foreign Policy: Controlling the Use of Force in the Nuclear Age ed. Michael Barnhart 
(New York: State Uniyersity of New York Press, 1987), 63.
""’ ibid., 66-67.
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Congress had learned the hard way not to write blank checks.”®®® But in a 
hearing before the House Committee on International Relations in 1975, a legal 
advisor for the State Department said that if the President had the power to 
commit men to hostilities “that power could not be taken away by concurrent 
resolution because the power is constitutional in nature.”®®®
According to historian Louis Fisher, presidents have submitted a number of 
reports under the War Powers Resolution since its creation. On three separate 
occasions President Gerald Ford “reported to Congress in his efforts to evacuate 
U.S. citizens and refugees from Vietnam and Cambodia citing his constitutional 
authority as commander in chief.”®®'* In 1980 President Jimmy Carter reported to 
Congress on the use of military force in his unsuccessful attempt to rescue 
American hostages in Iran. He also relied on the power of commander in chief 
and “Carter’s effort to consult with Congress was no better than Ford’s,” but 
“there was little criticism from legislators.”®®® President Ronald Reagan sent 
troops into Lebanon in 1982 and 1983 without reporting to Congress under 
Section 4(a)(1 ) of the War Powers Resolution. Again, Reagan used the power of 
commander in chief to justify his actions abroad. The use of the commander in 
chief phrase continued long after the War Powers Resolution.
"""p. Edward Haley, Congress and the Fall o f South Vietnam and Cam bodia (Rutherford, 
New Jersey; 1982), 44.
"""“War Powers: A Test of Compliance,” hearings before the House Committee on 
International Relations, 94*" Cong., 1®‘ Session 91 (1975).
""‘’ Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts, 286.
"""ibid., 287.
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Reagan was challenged in court twice for his use of war powers. In Crockett 
\f. Reagan twenty-nine members of Congress sued the administration for 
violating the War Powers Resolution by not reporting after sending troops to El 
Salvador. The judge said that he would not rule because “Congress failed to act 
legislatively to restrain Reagan.”®®® Congress also sued the President for his 
actions in Grenada in 1983, because he violated Congress’s constitutional 
obligation to declare war. But the judiciary refused to act because there was 
“relief available through the regular legislative process.”®®̂
The use of the President’s authority to command troops did not stop with 
Reagan. In 1990, President George Bush sent troops to Saudi Arabia (in 
preparation for the invasion of Iraq) after Iraq invaded Kuwait. The President 
claimed “authority as commander in chief to take unilateral military action” in Iraq. 
On December 13, 1990, U.S. district courts rejected two legal challenges. In the 
most important decision, Dellums v. Bush, the court ruled that “if Congress 
confronted the President and the President refused to accept a statutory 
restriction, the issue might be ripe for the courts.”®®®
The debate over the power to wage war remains alive today. There are 
various distinguishing characteristics about each branch’s power to control war, 
and countless numbers of interpretations about who can do what. As Louis 
Fisher contends, “presidents regularly claim the commander in chief clause
Crockett V. Reagan, 558 F.Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982). 
Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F.Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984). 
"""Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts, 290.
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empowers them to send troops anywhere in the world, including into hostilities, 
without first seeking legislative approval.”®®® This theory has withstood the 
argument time and again. In the history of the United States, only five wars have 
been declared whereas the nation had fought more than twenty undeclared 
wars.®®®
Two basic approaches to the problem of war power apply to this discussion: 
pro-Congress and pro-executive. The pro-Congress approach asserts that the 
“Constitution goes out of its way to take this power to declare war away from the 
president and give it to Congress.”®®* The framers gave the power of the purse 
to Congress because “executives tended to be more warlike than legislative 
bodies.”®®® The power to declare war was not meant to take power away from 
the executive, it was meant to counteract it.
The pro-executive position, as John Yoo would have us believe, portrays the 
Constitution as a “flexible system where the president possesses the power to 
initiate and conduct hostilities as commander in chief and checked by Congress’s 
power of the purse.”®®® As the Vietnam experience demonstrated, that power to 
fund was crushed by the administration’s cry to “rally around the flag.” Yoo 
argues that the executive’s “fundamental superiority to Congress in foreign
"""Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press,
1995), 185.
"""John Yoo, “War and the Constitutional Text,” University of Chicago Law Review 69 
Fall 2002, 11.
""’ Michael D. Ramsey, “War Powers: Textualism and War Powers,” University of Chicago 
Law Review 69 Fall 2002, 1.
"""Ely, War and Responsibility. 3.
"""Yoo, “War and the Constitutional Text,” 2.
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affairs” provides the flexibility needed “to accommodate the realities of the 
modern world.” He also contends that the “Framers did not believe they had 
established a strict, legalistic process for war making, but rather it was a living, 
breathing, working document in today’s society.”®®'* Declaring war was simply an 
outmoded action of Congress. It meant the power to “proclaim, recognize or 
publish,”®®® it did not mean initiate.
In retrospect, the War Powers Act was a completely unnecessary piece of 
legislation. The war was ending, troops had been pulled out and Congress had 
lived up to its constitutional mandate to cease funding for military activities in 
Indochina. So why the need for new legislation? Congress feared a future 
Vietnam, and congressmen did not learn by looking at the past and correcting 
what went wrong. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was what went wrong. When 
Congress passed legislation stating “this resolution shall expire when the 
President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably 
assured by international conditions,” and allowing the president “to take all 
necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United 
States and to prevent further aggression,”®®® Johnson and then Nixon were given 
virtually unlimited discretion. Whether or not the intention was good, the 
legislation was bad. If Congress had fulfilled its responsibilities to debate the 
resolution, the U.S. role in Vietnam might have been drastically different.
"""ibid., 3, 10.
"""ibid., 13.
"""Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Public Law 88-408; 78 Stat. 384, 10 August 1964.
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“Perhaps a more active role on the part of Congress in the decisions for war 
might have averted disaster.”®®̂
"""Herring, “The Executive, Congress, and the Vietnam War,” 184.
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CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was a spring-board for the War Powers Act, 
giving the executive legal justification and precedent to use forces abroad without 
a declaration from Congress. The intent behind the War Powers legislation might 
have been good, but that does not make it constitutional. Congress should 
provide the nation with a diversity of ideas and debate, but the American public 
did not get that with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Only forty-four minutes of 
debate in the House and two hours in the Senate did not satisfy this expectation.
Unfortunately, since World War II the United States have had to live in a 
highly complex and dangerous world. The United States faced weapons of mass 
destruction in 1964 and an enemy ideology that was frightening to most 
Americans and politicians. Communism was perceived as a world-wide threat, 
and most U.S. policymakers deemed it the driving force in South Vietnam. They 
could not let a country ostensibly yearning to be free, fall under oppression. The 
fear of twenty years of a Cold War policy affected every aspect of American life, 
and of course infiltrated the political system.
The Founders may not have predicted how the world would turn out, but they 
were sure of the way they intended the government of the United States to 
handle war. It has been a struggle for modern day scholars to decipher the
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founder’s intentions (if that can even be accomplished). Whether or not scholars 
believe in an evolving or static Constitution, it is clear that interpretations have 
changed. Distrust of the executive has faded in favor of placing trust in one man 
to better deal with the rapidly changing world that included nuclear weapons.
If the nation is willing to place its trust in one individual to plunge the United 
States into hostilities, then what does that say for the Congress? It is supposed 
to be the forum of discussion and examination of executive initiation. Congress 
did neither when considering the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Those senators who 
claimed to have voted for the resolution as only a retaliatory response to the 
attacks in early August either did not read the legislation or were being 
disingenuous. According to Pat Holt, the acting staff director of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, “observed that most Democratic senators 
accepted the resolution as a measured, moderate response to the alleged 
provocations in the Gulf.”®®® The Tonkin Resolution provided Johnson with an 
open mandate to fight aggression as long as he deemed it necessary to secure 
peace and safety in Indochina.
Even with early questioning of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents of August 4, 1964, 
Congress still failed to respond. It appropriated billions after billions of dollars for 
the war effort even after public condemnation for the war had swelled to record 
heights in the late 1960s. The dissent was like a snow ball tumbling downhill, 
and by 1969, Congress had begun to live up to its responsibilities by halting 
funds for certain activities in Indochina. That was too late to help the thousands
"""Oonald A. Ritchie, “Mike Mansfield and the Vietnam War,” in Vietnam and the American 
Political Tradition ed. Randall B. Woods (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 188.
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of soldiers who had died in an undeclared war. Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin 
B. Firmage declared that “the Vietnam War was a cooperative action. The 
President determined whether there should be war, who the enemies should be 
from time to time, and eventually, whether there should be no war. Congress 
contributed men and money for the President to use against whatever 
Indochinese he chose if he should decide to make war; Congress let him free to 
discontinue war at will. In short. Congress abdicated.”®®®
Several congressmen have said that they opposed the Vietnam War and the 
direction of United States foreign policy, but they did nothing because our “flag 
was committed.” They did not want to be associated with failing to support the 
troops in the field and so most reluctant congressmen fell into line by approving 
the administration’s supplemental appropriations year after year. Congress then 
created an avenue for the President to wage limited war on a more general basis 
without congressional approval by establishing the War Powers Act. Congress 
was long on talk but short on action.
The actions in early August 1964 and the years leading up to the War Powers 
Act are instructive. As George Wilhelm Hegel stated, “what experience and 
history teach is this—that people and governments never have learned anything 
from history.” The nation has now entered another war in Iraq by way of 
resolution. In the lead-up to the Iraq War, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
asserted before the United Nations and the world that the United States 
government along with its allies, had uncovered connections between al Qaeda
""^Wormuth and Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War. 218.
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and Saddam Hussein and that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Much like 
the Gulf of Tonkin Gulf incidents, we have learned that those connections made 
by Colin Powell have so far proved false. When the United States first entered 
hostilities in Iraq, there was little debate. There was the tendency to rally around 
the flag and fall in line behind the president to fight what some have called 
“America’s new Cold War” on terrorism. Dissent has grown in part because of 
the presidential elections, as was the case in1968, when Nixon promised to end 
the war with honor.
The American President has sought congressional approval not for legitimacy, 
but for “moral authority.” As Bob Woodward explained in his book Plan of Attack. 
White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card held an Iraq Coordination meeting on 
September 3, 2002, with other senior advisers to explain that the “President 
wants to involve Congress because he wants more moral authority in moving 
forward.”®'*® George W. Bush and other presidents have deemed congressional 
approval secondary to the President’s power of commander in chief, and Bob 
Woodward called the current resolution to wage war in Iraq “a blank check.”®'** It 
authorized the President to use U.S. armed forces in Iraq “as he deems to be 
necessary and appropriate”....while reporting back to Congress “no later than 
forty-eight hours after exercising authority.”®'*®
"'’"Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 168-69. 
""’ ibid., 204.
"""ibid., 203-04.
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The United States claimed that it was in Vietnam to help stabilize democracy 
and prevent the spread of communism. Not much has changed since then. The 
United States is in Iraq to prevent the spread of terrorism and stabilize a 
democracy in the Middle-East. In a chapter of his book, Does America Need a 
Foreign Policv. former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said that in talking 
about Iraq, “the United States and other industrial democracies have a 
compelling national interest in preventing the region from being dominated by 
countries whose purposes are inimical to ours."®'*® That was the justification for 
being in South Vietnam. The United States could not let the region fall because it 
was vital to its national interest.
There are two U.S. Supreme Court cases that have been decided since the 
War Powers passage in 1973 that might override the constitutionality of the 
resolution. The first decision decided in i983 was INS v. Chadha. Here the 
Court struck down the legislative veto because if “Congress wanted to control the 
executive branch it had to act not merely by both Houses but in a bill or joint 
resolution that is presented to the President.”®'*'* The second case was the 
Court’s decision in William J. Clinton, President of the United States v. City of 
New York (1998), which questioned the legality of the presidential line-item veto. 
Justice Anthony Kennedy spoke for the majority decision (6-3) in announcing that 
it was unconstitutional to surrender a power from one branch of government and
"""Royce Flippen ed. The Best American Political Writing 2002 (New York: Thunder’s 
Mouth Press, 2002), 356.
""'’Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts. 283.
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give that power to another branch. “That a congressional cession of power is 
voluntary does not make it innocuous.”®'*®
Twenty-twenty hindsight is a powerful tool. As Friedrich von Schlegel said,
“an historian is a prophet in reverse.” From that perspective, one might argue 
that the War Powers Act is unconstitutional. Congress cannot give up its duties 
in an effort to legislate new controls over foreign affairs. A new statute, 
regardless of Senator Eagleton’s concerns, was not needed then and it is not 
needed now. As Timothy Baylan and Glenn A. Phelps stated “Congress has not 
exercised -and seldom even threatened to exercise—the power of the purse 
once the President has taken action.”®'*®
For a democracy to exist there needs to be a collective body to deliberate and 
discuss the possibility of war before entering hostilities. Congress owes the men 
and women who put their lives on the line the assurance that not only the 
president, but that the American public have fully debated the reasons for 
deciding to go to war. As J. William Fulbright said in 1966, “dissent is the higher 
form of patriotism.” Not only must Congress agree, it must agree to disagree. As 
we have seen again in the past few years, those who dissent in time of war can 
and often are ostracized by the public and the White House. One can only hope 
the nation learns from the past and Congress fulfills its responsibilities to debate 
from beginning to end. The American public deserves at least that much. After
William J. Clinton, President o f the United States v City o f New York, No. 97-1374, 25
June 1998.
"""Baylan and Phelps, “The War Powers Resolution: A Rationale for Congressional 
Inaction,” 109-24.
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all, the failure of debate over the Gulf of Tonkin crisis led Congress to enact a 
War Power’s Resolution that actually grants power to the President not present in 
the Constitution.
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